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The casual observer of the legal academy would assume that negoti-
ability is a legal principle of foundational importance to our nation's
payment and credit systems. All of the obvious indicators support that
assumption. Among other things, the 1980s witnessed a major effort by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to update and revise the relevant provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code.' Similarly, negotiability continues to occupy
a safe position in law school curricula, as prominent academics at our most
elite schools continue to write casebooks focusing on negotiability. Most
recently, for example, Clayton Gillette, Alan Schwartz, and Bob Scott
have published a prominent new casebook on Payment Systems and Credit
Instruments, which presents a course organized around a detailed discussion
of negotiability and its consequences. 2 And Gillette, Schwartz, and Scott
are not outliers. They are working in the heartland of academic attention:
This decade has produced several other major casebooks for courses with a
similar focus on the principles of negotiability, 3 as well as a number of
1. The revised version of Article 3 of the U.C.C. ("Negotiable Instruments") has gained
broad acceptance. By early 1996, 42 states and the District of Columbia had adopted it. UNIF.
COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1996).
2. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE ET AL., PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND CREDIT INSTRUMENTS (1996).
The authors follow a brief introductory chapter with three lengthy chapters covering "negoti-
ability and its consequences," "the contract liability of parties to a negotiable instrument," and
"holder in due course." Id. chs. 2-4, at 37-299. The centrality of negotiability as an organizing
principle is evident from their decision to incorporate into their chapter on holders in due course
discussions of plainly nonnegotiable systems such as credit cards. See id. at 288-99.
3. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1993); ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS AND LETTERS OF CREDIT (1992); STEVE H. NICKLES ET AL., MODERN
COMMERCIAL PAPER: THE NEW LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (AND RELATED
COMMERCIAL PAPER) (1994); DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PAYMENT
LAW (4th ed. 1995) (starting with detailed chapters on negotiability, negotiation, holders in due
course, and liability on instruments). For exceptions to that approach, see EDWARD L. RUBIN &
ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: CASES, MATERIALS, AND ISSUES (1989) (law-and-
economics perspective that omits any extended analysis of negotiability). See also LYNN M.
LOPUCKI, ELIZABETH WARREN, DANIEL L. KEATING & RONALD J. MANN, COMMERCIAL
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treatises and related works that offer detailed doctrinal analyses of negotia-
bility.4
But it would be wrong to accept those indicators. At least in the
payment and credit contexts (the subjects on which academics have focused
their analysis of negotiability), negotiability is an outmoded and decaying
relic. Moreover, even in the checking system-the most significant context
where negotiable instruments survive-legal and practical developments
have rendered principles of negotiability all but irrelevant to the operation
of the system. To be sure, I am not the first to bear witness to the declin-
ing role of negotiability. A few previous scholars, most notably Jim Rogers,
have noticed some aspects of the decline in the doctrinal significance of the
rules of negotiability.5 Others have speculated as to the limited use of
negotiable instruments in modem commerce.6 But those limited efforts
have done little or nothing to dispel the general impression that negotiabil-
ity remains significant. Certainly, negotiability must be important in some
context or so many people would not be devoting so much time to industri-
ous examination and explanation of the system. Right?
No. That impression is wrong, in a most fundamental way. In an
effort to lay that impression finally to rest, this Article moves beyond the
existing literature in two ways. First, by looking at payment and credit
systems from a broad, functional perspective, I can illustrate how under-
lying systemic forces (predominantly technological, but sometimes law-
TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (forthcoming 1997) (systems perspective that relegates
negotiability to a brief discussion at the close of the payment materials, which emphasizes the
practical insignificance of the topic).
4. See, e.g., FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT
SYSTEMS AND NOTES (2d ed. 1992) (a ten-chapter treatise with seven chapters on negotiable
instruments, two chapters on checks, and one chapter on payment systems other than negotiable
instruments); STEVE H. NICKLES, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER RELATED
COMMERCIAL PAPER (2d ed. 1993).
5. For Rogers' cogent analysis of the tension between negotiability and the doctrinal legal
rules that govern the current checking system, see James Steven Rogers, The Irrelevance of
Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based Payment System, 65 TEX. L. REV. 929
(1987) [hereinafter Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instruments Concepts]. For similar schol-
arship in the area of investment securities, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A
New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 305 (1990); James Steven Rogers, An Essay on Horseless Carriages and Paperless
Negotiable Instruments: Some Lessons from the Article 8 Revision, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 689 (1995)
[hereinafter Rogers, Horseless Caniages]; James Steven Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity,
12 CARDOzO L. REV. 471 (1990). 1 also should mention the somewhat darker perspective offered
by Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441,
446-58 (1979), which argues not that negotiable instruments law disappeared because of changes
in economic conditions, but instead that bankers called it into service to further their personal
interests in transactions to which negotiable instruments law never should have been applied.
6. See, e.g., RUBIN & COOTER, supra note 3, at 6-7.
related) have undermined the usefulness of negotiability in all of its
manifestations. Like all legal institutions, negotiability was called into
existence to respond to problems of a particular time and place. The com-
plete transformation of the technology of financial activity that has taken
place during the closing decades of this century has created a transactional
setting that bears no significant resemblance to the pre-Industrial Revolu-
tion world in which negotiability first came to be used in payment systems.
Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that it is hard to discern a useful
role for negotiability in the financial world of the twenty-first century.
Secondly, and more importantly, I present several different categories
of empirical evidence designed to demonstrate that my general view of the
underlying technological forces is reflected in what actually has happened
in our nation's financial markets. The evidence includes the results of a
series of more than a dozen interviews with individuals experienced in
various kinds of financial transactions.7 I also collected actual documents
used in a variety of payment and credit transactions, enabling me to present
evidence regarding the actual usage of negotiability in those contexts.8
Similarly, to get a firsthand look at the practicalities of check processing, I
visited the check-collection facilities of two major banks located in differ-
ent Federal Reserve districts.' Finally, in order to evaluate the accuracy of
my impressions about the irrelevance of holder-in-due-course status to the
check-collection process, I conducted a survey of reported cases decided
since 1985 that mention holder-in-due-course status in the checking con-
text.
This Article presents my analysis in four steps. I start in Part I with a
general discussion of negotiability that focuses on two major points. The
first is an explanation of the basic premise of negotiability: a system that
fosters exclusive reliance on a document can enhance the liquidity of the
assets covered by that document. The second is a discussion of why that
premise is obsolete: designed for transactions in a horse-and-buggy econ-
omy, negotiability's focus on physical documents imposes a significant bur-
den on transactions in the current age of electronic information processing.
7. To enhance the accuracy and verifiability of my records of the interviews, I recorded
and transcribed the interviews whenever practicable. In most of the cases in which that was not
practicable, I took contemporaneous handwritten or typed notes of the interviews, from which I
promptly produced a typescript record of the interview. Copies of those transcripts and records
are available upon request.
8. Copies of any of the documents cited in this Article are available upon request.
9. The two banks were The Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis and The First National
Bank of Chicago.
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Part II turns from the abstract analysis of Part I to present empirical
evidence about actual current financial practices. The sections of Part II
survey the various types of payment and credit systems used most commonly
in our economy. My analysis includes the major nonchecking payment
systems in which documents reflect the payment obligation (credit cards
and letters of credit), as well as the most important types of credit obliga-
tions in our economy (consumer promissory notes used to purchase personal
property or homes, private commercial obligations, and long-term and
short-term publicly traded commercial obligations). Relying on the inter-
views and sample documents that I have collected, I can show that negotia-
bility is rarely used in any of those systems.'0
Analysis of the checking system is reserved for Part III. Based on my
interviews and site visits, Part III shows how the exigencies of commerce
have rendered the basic concepts of negotiability irrelevant to the current
check-processing system. Although most previous scholars have focused on
doctrinal niceties to show how the applicable legal rules can be explained
without reference to traditional rules of negotiability, my focus on the
practicalities of the processing system allows me to present a much broader
critique. The irrelevance of negotiability is much more complete than
previous scholars suggest because its cause is more fundamental than a
simple revision of the applicable legal rules. The pressure of technological
change has rendered the most basic features of the negotiable instrument a
positive hindrance to any modem payment system. The legal rules accom-
modating the passage of negotiability are mere patchwork details that re-
flect a situation brought about by developments external to the law.
Finally, Part IV summarizes the implications of my analysis for the
ongoing development of payment systems. The time has passed when it is
sensible to complete payment transactions by transporting physical objects
and examining them to determine the nature of the signatures that appear
on them. To function effectively, a modem payment system must follow
10. 1 do not assert that negotiability is never used in any system. Indeed, it is clear that
negotiability still plays some role in transactions that use documents of title. See, e.g., John F.
Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
579, 589-92 (1993). Moreover, even in the context of payment and credit systems (the subject of
this Article), my research has been limited to a survey of the major domestic systems and has
focused on dispelling the notion that negotiability has any significance to the overall structure of
our financial system. Accordingly, even though it is likely that negotiability persists in some
range of transactions that I do not discuss, I do not think that that possibility establishes a signifi-
cant role for negotiability. The fact that the transactions in which it persists are so unusual
underscores my basic point: technological developments have marginalized a legal institution that
once was central to financial transactions.
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the lead already taken by most of the highly liquid credit systems. It must
abandon all of the features that made negotiability useful in the pre-
Industrial Revolution economies in which it developed. The demands of a
modern economy call for payment systems that focus on data instead of
documents, and that provide for contemporaneous approvals by the ulti-
mate payor rather than the cumbersome and time-consuming clearing pro-
cess that characterizes transactions using checks and other negotiable
instruments.
Thus, the decline and fall of negotiability does not mean the end of
the law of payment systems. It calls for new law-related systems designed to
defuse the issues that arise in new data-based payment systems. To accom-
plish that task, the law must abandon its fixation with the paradigm of
negotiability and focus instead on the practical realities of the contexts in
which new payment systems are used.
I. NEGOTIABILITY: AN OUTMODED SYSTEM FOR ENHANCING LIQUIDITY
To say anything useful about negotiability, it is necessary to start by
offering a general explanation of what negotiability is and why anybody
would want to use it. The easiest way to do that is to work from an ideal-
ized model transaction that uses a negotiable instrument to make pay-
ment." Because my account is designed to illustrate how the benefits of
negotiability could make it a useful device in payment and credit transac-
tions,' I start with a transaction in which negotiability in fact would be
useful, modeled on the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century transactions in
which negotiable instruments first came to play a significant role in pay-
ment transactions. 3
Thus, posit a clothier ("Clothier") attempting to purchase wool from a
wool merchant ("Merchant"). Clothier's principal source of income is from
11. I compensate for the simplification and abstraction of the discussion in this Part with
the concrete empirical evidence about current usage that I present in Parts II and III of this
Article.
12. Although it is feasible to use negotiability as a system to enhance the liquidity of many
different kinds of assets, this Article focuses on the use of negotiability in connection with pay-
ment and credit systems, the area in which legal academics traditionally have shown the most
interest. Thus, this Article does not consider the use of negotiability under U.C.C. Article 7 to
cover bills of lading, warehouse receipts, or other documents of title.
13. See generally JAMES STEVEN ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND
NOTES: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW 94-124 (1995)
(historical discussion of the process by which bills of exchange came to be used as payment and
credit devices rather than as devices for transferring funds from one location to another).
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the sale of finished clothes to a factor ("Factor") that is in the business of
buying finished clothes and reselling them to retailers. In an economy in
which cash was the sole nonbarter payment medium, Clothier probably
would obtain cash by selling finished clothes to Factor, and then would use
that cash to pay Merchant for the wool. It would be considerably more
convenient, however (particularly in economies that are short of cash),14 if
Clothier could pay Merchant with a bill of exchange (or some other form of
instrument); with a documentary noncash payment, Clothier could pay
Merchant without first obtaining cash from Factor. In the typical transac-
tion using a negotiable instrument, Clothier would pay Merchant with a
"draft" drawn on Factor. The draft would represent funds that Factor al-
ready owes, or in the future might owe, to Clothier for clothes purchased,
or to be purchased, from Clothier.' 5 Merchant, in turn, could obtain cash
by seeking payment from Factor or by selling the draft to a third party.
Alternatively, Merchant could use the draft to pay for other goods and
services it purchased from a third party. 16
From an economic perspective, the biggest problem with that arrange-
ment is the difficulty in which it places Merchant: how can Merchant be
sure that Factor or anybody else will be willing to give Merchant money or
other valuable goods and services in exchange for the draft? Absent some
strong reason to expect that the draft will be valuable, Merchant will be
unlikely to accept the draft without insisting upon a substantial premium
over the price at which it would sell goods for cash. The rules of negotia-
bility respond directly to that problem by making it easier for Merchant to
sell the draft-by enhancing its liquidity.
The benefits of enhanced liquidity are obvious. At least in commer-
cial contexts, an asset that is easy to sell normally is more valuable than an
otherwise similar asset that is hard to sell. 7 That is true both because of
14. See id. at 109 (describing the development of bills as a payment medium in "a com-
munity [that] is unlikely to have a sufficient volume of specie or specie substitutes to settle all of
its transactions"); Gilmore, supra note 5, at 447 (attributing development of negotiable instru-
ments law in part to the "chronically... short supply" of metallic currency).
15. In modem parlance, a draft is an instrument signed by one party (Clothier in this case)
directing another party (Factor in this case) to pay money to yet another party (Merchant in this
case). See U.C.C. § 3-104(e) (1991) (defining "draft" as an instrument that contains an "order");
id. § 3-103(a)(6) (defining "order").
16. See ROGERS, supra note 13, at 111-12 (describing a transaction of this type as common
in England in the 17th and 18th centuries).
17. See CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 248-56 (1950) (discussing factors affect-
ing the "marketability" of assets); GERALD P. O'DRISCOLL, JR. & MARIO J. RIZZO, THE
ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE 193 (1996) (explaining why "entrepreneur-traders will
prefer holding their wealth in more marketable commodities").
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the enhanced flexibility available to the owner of a readily salable asset, 8
and because of the increased price that the owner is likely to obtain upon
the sale of an asset that is highly liquid. Given two assets with the same
expected economic productivity, the more liquid asset usually can be sold
for more than the less liquid one. 9 Thus, all other things being equal,
rules that enhance the liquidity of negotiable instruments should enhance
the relative attractiveness, and thus the relative value, of negotiable pay-
ment instruments.
The general tactic by which negotiability responds to the problem of
illiquidity is to centralize all rights to the underlying asset (a right of
payment in this context) in a single physical document. The classic termi-
nology describes the obligation to pay as "merged" in the document.2 ,
That approach enhances liquidity by reducing the costs a prospective
purchaser incurs in acquiring two related types of information about the
asset: information about claims that undermine the value of the payment
obligation that the instrument represents, and information about title to
the payment obligation.
To the modem observer, the most salient enhancement of liquidity is
associated with holder-in-due-course status.21 The value of holder-in-due-
course status is that it reduces the incentive for the purchaser to inquire
about claims that might undermine the value of the asset by the forceful
mechanism of cutting off many of those claims. Thus, a party that follows
the rules of the negotiability system when it acquires a negotiable instru-
18. See MENGER, supra note 17, at 249 ("[The commodity whose market is poorly organized
can be brought to its final destination only with economic sacrifices, and in some cases not at
all."); O'DRISCOLL & Rizzo, supra note 17, at 194 ("Liquidity provides economic agents with
flexibility, flexibility that lowers cost.").
19. For an illustrative example, see Tania Padgett, Mark Twain Stock Jumps as Bank Unveils
Plan for Listing on N.Y. Exchange, AM. BANKER, Aug. 7, 1996, at 24, which notes that the stock
of Mark Twain Bancshares rose more than 2% on a day when Standard & Poors' bank index fell
by 0.02%, and attributes the increased price to investors' anticipation of increased liquidity based
upon an anticipated shift of trading in the stock from NASDAQ to the New York Stock Ex-
change.
20. As Grant Gilmore put it,
mhe idea which was basic to the structure was the idea that the piece of paper on which
the bill was written or printed should be treated as if it-the piece of paper-was itself
the claim or debt which it evidenced. This idea came to be known as the doctrine of
merger-the debt was merged in the instrument.
Gilmore, supra note 5, at 449.
21. As Jim Rogers has shown, the importance of holder-in-due-course status is a relatively
recent development. See ROGERS, supra note 13, at 189-93.
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ment takes free of most types of defenses to payment, even if those defenses
would have been valid against the seller of the instrument.2
To use my model transaction as an example, suppose that Clothier
purchased wool on credit and discovered before paying for it that the wool
Merchant had sold failed to conform to the agreement between Merchant
and Clothier. Under ordinary contract principles, a sufficiently serious
defect would entitle Clothier to withhold all or some portion of the remain-
ing price.23 But if Clothier had given Merchant a negotiable draft for the
purchase price, and Merchant had negotiated that draft to a third party that
became a holder in due course (Bank), Clothier would be obligated to pay
Bank even if Merchant itself never could have forced Clothier to pay for
the wool.
2 4
However unfair that rule might seem to Clothier, it can lower Cloth-
ier's overall costs if it lowers the transaction costs that Merchant must incur
in obtaining cash or something else of value in exchange for Clothier's
obligation to pay. By giving Bank immunity from most of the plausible
defenses to payment that Clothier might assert, holder-in-due-course status
can obviate the need for Bank to inquire about the existence of those de-
fenses. Thus, the holder-in-due-course rules enhance the liquidity of obliga-
tions by enhancing the ability of a purchaser to rely solely on the document
in evaluating the nature of the obligation. If the document is in proper
form and the seller transfers it properly, the purchaser takes the instrument
free of all but a few specialized defenses that Clothier might interpose.25 If
that benefit makes the instrument more valuable to Bank, then it makes
the instrument more valuable to Merchant, and thus should make Mer-
chant more willing to accept the instrument as payment from Clothier.
22. For the rights of a "holder in due course" under Article 3, see U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 3-306
(1991).
23. See id. § 2-717 (1995).
24. See id. § 3-305(a)(2), (b) (1991) (stating that a holder in due course takes free of "a de-
fense of the obligor ... that would be available if the person entitled to enforce the instrument
were enforcing a right to payment under a simple contract").
25. The remaining defenses are the so-called "real" defenses set out in U.C.C. section
3-305(a)(1). See id. § 3-305(b) ("The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation of a
party to pay the instrument is subject to defenses of the obligor stated in [U.C.C. section
3-305](a)(1)."). None of those real defenses-infancy, duress, lack of capacity, illegality of the
transaction, fraud in fact (execution of the instrument without an opportunity to understand it),
and insolvency-present claims likely to be raised by a party with any hope of continuing to
engage in commercial transactions.
Searching for Negotiability 959
The second major benefit of negotiability is a simplification of title
issues, which can lower the costs that a purchaser expends in investigating
title. When a document is negotiable, substantially all of the information
necessary to evaluate title to the asset appears on the face of the document
in its original terms or in indorsements subsequently placed on the docu-
ment. At least in the absence of forgery, a person who wishes to purchase a
negotiable document can verify that the purported seller can convey good
title without any inquiry other than the examination of the document. If
the document is in bearer form,26 then mere possession is enough to ob-
tain title. 7 The inquiry is more complicated if the document is in order
form, but even then the buyer need only examine the document (including
any indorsements that appear on the document) to determine whether the
seller is the person to whose order the document runs. If so, the seller can
convey title to the purchaser by the simple acts of indorsement and delivery
of the document.2
Centralization of title information on the document distinguishes
assets covered by negotiable documents from other kinds of assets. When a
person purchases goods, for example, he ordinarily acquires only the "title
which his transferor had."29 Thus, a party that purchases goods without
verifying the source of the seller's title must accept the risk that the seller
in fact does not have good title to convey. Evaluating that risk may be
more or less burdensome depending on particular circumstances, but in
many cases it will be much harder for a purchaser to evaluate its seller's
title to goods than it would be if the asset in question were in negotiable
form. It is much easier to read the face of a check to verify that the named
payee is the individual at the front of the teller line than it is to obtain and
verify an invoice through which a prospective seller purchased goods that
somebody wishes to buy. Similarly, the purchaser of real estate cannot
satisfy itself that its seller has title solely by determining that the seller has
unchallenged possession of the land. Instead, the purchaser ordinarily must
review public real-estate records in order to determine whether those re-
26. To determine whether a document is in bearer form, a prospective purchaser need only
compare the terms of the document and its indorsements to the statutory requirements for bearer
and order form. See id. § 3-109 (rules for making instruments payable to bearer and to order); id.
§ 3-205(a), (b) (rules for changing the form of paper by indorsement).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1-201(20) (1996); id. § 3-205(a) (1991).
29. Id. § 2-403(1) (1995).
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cords reveal any competing claims to the land. 0 By obviating the need
for such inquiries, negotiability can reduce the search costs that a purchaser
incurs to determine whether a purported seller in fact owns the asset that
the purchaser wishes to acquire.
The abstract theoretical benefits of negotiability, however, are only
one side of the story. The core mechanism by which negotiability offers
those benefits-streamlining investigation and transfer to focus on the
physical object that represents the underlying obligation-carries with it the
fatal flaw that has driven negotiability's declining relevance. Negotiability
arose in an economy of payment transactions among parties well known to
all. In transactions occurring during that era, both Merchant and Bank
should have been familiar not only with Clothier's general financial respon-
sibility and signature,3' but also with Factor's financial responsibility and
its relationship with Clothier. In that context, negotiability provided a
significant benefit by enabling parties like Merchant and Bank reliably to
streamline a sale transaction into a simple transfer of possession of a docu-
ment.3
2
But times have changed and with them the size and interrelations of
our economy, as well as the state of information technology. In this mod-
ern age of multiple and rapid transactions in a national and perhaps global
market, negotiability's emphasis on the physical document is a hindrance
rather than a benefit. In many transactions, transporting a document from
buyer to seller is no longer a simple matter of pushing a piece of paper
across a table. Furthermore, even if the buyer and the seller meet face-to-
face, the financial institution on whom the instrument is drawn commonly
is located at a distance from one or both of the parties to the underlying
transaction. The frequent need to transport the document thousands of
30. See, e.g., 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 213-47 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing effects
of real-estate recording statutes on title to land).
31. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 10, at 580 (stating that "knowledge [of other merchant's
signatures] was essential to the circulation of the payments system's paper").
32. For a similar account in a related context, see Stuart Banner, "Not a Fancy Man on the
Board": American Securities Regulation, 1800-1860, at 15-16 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (explaining how the desire to facilitate the transfer of stock certificates motivated
American courts in the early decades of the nineteenth century to adopt negotiability-like rules
that permitted valid transfers of stock solely by delivery of the instrument, even if the parties
failed to comply with corporate charters that required stock transfers to be noted on the books of
the issuer).
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miles is a much more common problem now than it was in the era when
our country was founded.
Similarly, with the rise of computers, it is no longer so easy to see the
benefit of rules that limit the purchaser's inquiry to an examination of a
physical document. In many contexts, a purchaser could examine electron-
ically stored records much more expeditiously than it could examine the
physical signatures and form of an individual document. Furthermore, the
dramatic increase in the number of transactions and transacting parties
makes it impractical for a party to obtain the information it needs simply
from the examination of a signature. Modem technology offers mecha-
nisms for confirming payment authorizations that are much more effective
than the physical signature that is central to the negotiability system.
In sum, the historical conditions that called negotiability into service
to enhance the liquidity of payment obligations have passed from our econ-
omy. In the absence of those conditions, the document- and signature-
based concepts of negotiability no longer provide significant benefits to the
parties that choose to use them. Accordingly, it should be no surprise to
find, as Parts II and III demonstrate, that modem financial systems relegate
negotiability to a position of small and continually decreasing significance.
Il. THE RARITY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
One of the most telling but least acknowledged facts about nego-
tiability is the limited extent to which it still appears in payment and credit
transactions. To realize just how far negotiability has fallen, one must
recognize how rarely it is used. Putting checks aside for the moment,33
none of the major payment or credit systems34 in our economy appears
commonly in a form that satisfies the technical requirements of nego-
tiability. The reasons for the limited impact of negotiability differ from
area to area. In some cases, direct and indirect legal restrictions reflect
legislative and administrative decisions to reject negotiability for policy
reasons. In most areas, however, the decline of negotiability has been
driven by technological change. Thus, technological advances commonly
leave negotiability with such an insignificant value to the modem transac-
tion that the parties simply do not care whether the obligations are put in
33. Part III discusses the irrelevance of negotiability concepts to the operation of the check-
ing system.
34. For a brief explanation of the distinction I draw between payment systems and credit
systems, see LOPUCKI, WARREN, KEATING & MANN, supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 15, at 1-2,
on file with author); id. (manuscript assign. 23, at 1-2, on file with author).
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negotiable form. Moreover, in at least one area (commercial paper), tech-
nological developments have gone so far as to render negotiability so posi-
tively harmful that the transactions do not use instruments of negotiable
form even though the positive law formally requires negotiability.
I start in Subpart A with the major nonchecking payment systems.
Subpart B then considers the main forms of credit obligations: consumer
promissory notes, private commercial obligations, and publicly traded com-
mercial obligations.
A. Nonchecking Payment Systems
Aside from the obvious example of checking, few of the payment
systems in common usage in this country use documents in any significant
way. For example, there is no place for paper in the trillion-dollar-a-day
system for wire transfers,3" and no significant place for paper in the rapidly
growing36 debit-card system. 7 The paperless nature of developing pay-
ment systems involving stored-value cards and electronic money will leave
negotiability similarly irrelevant to those systems.3" But negotiability also
is notably absent from the two common nonchecking payment systems that
involve written commitments to pay: credit cards and letters of credit.
Although the absence of negotiability from those systems is not surprising,
it is important to understand that the absence of negotiability from those
systems is not fortuitous. Those systems refrain from using negotiability
because negotiability is directly incompatible with important aspects of
those systems as they currently operate. Thus, a discussion of those systems
35. For statistics on the volume of wire transfers in this country, see Federal Reserve Bank
Services, 60 Fed. Reg. 111, 112 (1995) (reporting an average daily volume in 1993 of about $1.8
trillion of transfers made over Fedwire and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS)). For a general discussion of the wire-transfer system, see LOPUCKI, WARREN, KEATING
& MANN, supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 20, on file with author).
36. Industry sources estimate that the number of point-of-sale debit-card terminals has
grown from just 17,000 in 1986 to about 130,000 by 1993. See 1 THE BANKERS ROUNDTABLE,
BANKING'S ROLE IN TOMORROW'S PAYMENT SYSTEM 51 (1994) (reporting statistics). In 1993,
consumers used those terminals to conduct about 400 million point-of-sale transactions. See 2 id.
at 97 (reporting statistics).
37. Although the Electronic Fund Transfer Act requires the institution to provide the con-
sumer "written documentation" of each debit-card transfer, Consumer Credit Protection Act
§ 906(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1693d(a) (1994), the consumer ordinarily does not sign the slip. The slip is
simply a record of a previously authorized transaction, which has no role in demonstrating the
consumer's obligation. For a general discussion of the debit-card system, see LOPUCKI, WARREN,
KEATING & MANN, supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 18, on file with author).
38. For a general discussion of those systems, see LOPUCKI, WARREN, KEATING & MANN,
supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 22, on file with author).
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provides a good introduction to the contextual reasons that limit the signif-
icance of negotiability in modem financial transactions.
1. Credit Cards
Credit cards are a good place to start because they are one of the most
successful and common payment systems used by consumers, and because
negotiability obviously has no relevance whatsoever to the credit-card
system.39 Although consumers ordinarily do sign credit-card slips to re-
flect the payment obligation when they engage in face-to-face credit-card
transactions, the slip in its customary form plainly is not a negotiable in-
strument. Most obviously, the slip fails to satisfy the requirement that it be
payable to "bearer" or "order." 4°
Of course, if it were just a matter of form in the wording of the slip,
the credit-card industry could obtain the benefits of negotiability by re-
designing credit-card slips to put them into negotiable form. Even if the
credit-card industry did so, however, federal law would prevent the institu-
tions that purchase the slips from merchants from gaining the practical
benefits of holder-in-due-course status. Specifically, the Truth in Lending
Act generally requires that consumers retain defenses to payment obliga-
tions that they incur with credit cards.4'
This rule reflects a firm rejection of one of the basic policies of nego-
tiability: the idea that enhancing the liquidity of a payment instrument (in
this case, the credit-card slip) provides more benefits to the parties than any
harm that the payor suffers through losing the ability to assert defenses
against subsequent holders of the instrument.4 In this area, the Truth in
39. Although the credit-card transaction involves an at least transient extension of credit to
the purchaser, the fact that it provides substantially contemporaneous payment to the payee leads
me to treat the credit-card system as a payment system rather than a credit system.
40. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(1) (1991) (negotiable instruments must be "payable to bearer or to
order"); see also id. § 3-109 (explaining the bearer-or-order requirement).
41. Truth in Lending Act § 170, 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1994) (allowing consumers to assert
against the banks issuing their credit cards all defenses to payment that would be valid in suits on
the underlying transactions); see 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1996) (regulatory explication of that rule).
Although the rule is subject to a number of exceptions that might limit its effectiveness in cur-
rent practice, see LOPUCKI, WARREN, KEATING & MANN, supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 19, at
7-10, on file with author), it would prevent the industry from making holder-in-due-course status
the norm.
42. The credit-card system as it currently operates also rejects the document-centered focus
of negotiability, for credit-card transactions increasingly are processed through electronic trans-
mission of the transaction information rather than through physical transportation of the credit-
card slip itself. See Jeremy Quitmer, Processing Paper on Wane, But Still Lucrative, AM. BANKER,
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Lending Act reflects the contrary view: any adverse impact on the avail-
ability of credit-card lending to consumers will be counterbalanced by the
advantage that consumers gain from the right to challenge their obligation
to pay for goods purchased by credit card. The continuing healthy level of
credit-card transactions (1995 saw 280 million active credit-card accounts,
which were used to purchase $600 billion worth of goods and services43)
suggests that the rule has not unduly constricted merchants' willingness to
accept credit cards." At bottom, it is unlikely that the absence of holder-
in-due-course status and the other benefits of negotiability has held back
the credit-card industry significantly.
2. Letters of Credit
A glance at a typical letter of credit evidences a similar absence of
negotiability. As with the credit-card slip, the most definitive technical
defect is the absence of "bearer" or "order" language in a letter of credit.4"
As with credit cards, however, the reason for the absence of negotiability is
more fundamental than some technical form of words. The most basic
difficulty is that a letter of credit is not intended to be an unconditional
obligation of the bank that issues it. On the contrary, a letter of credit is
by its nature a conditional obligation-the bank is obligated to pay only if
the beneficiary or some permitted assignee of the beneficiary submits a draft
Nov. 1, 1996, at 10 (estimating that only five percent of 1996 domestic credit-card transactions
would use paper-based processing).
43. Market Shares, NILSON REP., Apr. 1996, at 4.
44. On that point, I note that general purpose credit-card purchases grew by 18% in 1995
alone. Id. For a general discussion of the rise of the credit card, see Elizabeth Warren,
Mortgaging the Future: The Consumer Debt Binge of the 1980s, at ch. 2 (Aug. 31, 1994) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
45. For a readily available and authoritative form, see INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, ICC GUIDE TO DOCUMENTARY CREDIT OPERATIONS 47 (ICC Publication No. 515)
(1994) [hereinafter ICC PUBL. NO. 515] (reprinting a standard form for an irrevocable confirmed
documentary letter of credit). In connection with this Article, I also have reviewed the forms
used by the Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis and NationsBank of Texas, N.A. Those forms
are similar in all relevant respects to the ICC form cited above. Copies of those forms are avail-
able on request.
46. There are other reasons that a negotiable letter of credit would be unpalatable to an
issuing bank. The most obvious is the reluctance of banks to accept free transfers of the letters of
credit that they issue. See James J. White, The Influence of International Practice on the Revision of
Article 5 of the U.C.C., 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 189, 202-03 (1995) (discussing the reluctance
of issuers to permit free assignment of letters of credit). The problem discussed in the text, how-
ever, seems to me to be the most fundamental and thus most generally illustrative of the difficul-
ties of accommodating negotiability to the broad variety of payment transactions.
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that complies with the conditions stated in the letter of credit. 7 Because
the rules for negotiability are not sufficiently flexible to cover conditional
obligations, 4' negotiability has no significant role to play in the domestic
letter-of-credit system.4 9
B. Credit Systems
When we turn from transactions in which payment is made contempo-
raneously with the underlying transaction to transactions in which payment
is deferred through the extension of credit, we must confront a considerably
less standardized set of systems. Because of the broad variety of mechanisms
for extending credit, I cannot claim that I have surveyed all of the systems
that are present in our economy. Thus, I acknowledge that there probably
are some negotiable credit documents still being issued, but the evidence
that I present does suggest that those documents are increasingly unusual.
For purposes of this discussion, I analyze three different types of credit
transactions: consumer credit obligations, private commercial obligations
(promissory notes), and publicly traded commercial obligations (bonds and
commercial paper).
47. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (1996); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 9 (1993) (ICC Publication No. 500)
[hereinafter UCP.
48. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1991) (imposing requirement that instrument be unconditional);
id. § 3-106 (explaining what features make an obligation unconditional).
49. Negotiability may play some limited role in international transactions, in which letters
of credit are used to confirm a buyer's commitment to pay for purchased goods. See LOPUCKI,
WARREN, KEATING & MANN, supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 21, at 2-5, on file with author)
(describing that transaction); Dolan, supra note 10, at 588 (same). The buyer in such a trans-
action might present the draft to a party other than the issuer, and the party acquiring that draft
might negotiate it to a holder in due course. See ICC PUBL. No. 515, supra note 45, at 92-93
(describing the mechanics of such transactions). Although I have no hard evidence on the ques-
tion, my sense from informal conversations with American bankers is that it is not common for
such a draft to be negotiated to a party other than the issuer of the letter of credit or some other
bank that has confirmed or advised the credit. In those circumstances, holder-in-due-course
status would have limited relevance because the holder of the draft normally would have rights
against the beneficiary directly under letter-of-credit law, without regard to rules of negotiability.
See U.C.C. § 5-111 (1996). Moreover, at least one commentator believes that even in the inter-
national context, drafts are becoming less common as parties increasingly turn to simpler proce-
dures for open-account sales. See Dolan, supra note 10, at 588.
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1. Consumer Credit Obligations
The most significant situation in which consumers receive credit is in
the form of a loan extended in connection with a purchase by the con-
sumer. Because different legal rules have fostered practices for sales of
goods and services that differ from the practices for sales of homes, I treat
those two types of obligations separately.
a. Notes for the Purchase of Goods and Services
There is no need to examine the customary terms and conditions of
the promissory notes that consumers sign when they receive credit in con-
nection with their purchase of goods or services, because federal law gener-
ally bars the exercise of holder-in-due-course rights against consumers in
that context.
Specifically, the Federal Trade Commission has promulgated a regula-
tion that bars holder-in-due-course status for consumer credit transactions
involving goods and services. That regulation makes it an unfair trade
practice to receive a promissory note in a consumer credit sale transaction
unless the note includes the following legend: "Any holder of this con-
sumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor
could assert against the seller of goods and services obtained pursuant
hereto or with the proceeds hereof.", 0  Violation of the regulation is pun-
ishable by a penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation.51
As the FTC explained when it adopted that regulation, the rule re-
flects a considered rejection of one of the cornerstones of negotiability: the
benefits of holder-in-due-course status. As discussed above, negotiability
rests on the idea that all parties to a lending transaction benefit from a rule
that enhances the liquidity of the payment instrument.5" From the FTC's
50. FTC Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a)
(1996). The regulation requires a similar notice in transactions in which the seller receives funds
generated by a loan that a separate entity issues. Id. § 433.2(b). The only major exception
applies in situations in which the seller has no relationship with the creditor "by common con-
trol, contract, or business arrangement." Id. § 433.1(d).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 45() (1994).
52. See supra pp. 957-62.
perspective, by contrast, holder-in-due-course status is unfair to consumers
because it "make[s] the consumer's duty to pay independent of the seller's
duty to fulfill [its contractual] obligations. 5 3  Thus, the FTC reasoned,
consumers should not be forced by the holder-in-due-course rule to pay for
goods and services that sellers do not actually deliver to them. 4
Although the FTC legend imposes a condition on the consumer's
obligation to pay that ordinarily would deprive the note of negotiability,5
Article 3 includes a provision designed to treat a promissory note including
that legend as a negotiable instrument.56 Nevertheless, the ordinary holder-
in-due-course protections of negotiability have nothing to do with enforce-
ment of such notes. The statute expressly acknowledges that "there cannot
be a holder in due course of [such an] instrument. '' s7  Accordingly, the
consumer in this context (just as in the credit-card context) generally has
the right to withhold payment from the ultimate holder of the instrument
on the same terms under which the consumer could withhold payment from
the merchant with whom the consumer dealt directly.
b. Notes for the Purchase of a Home
The FTC regulation does not apply to notes given in connection with
the purchase of a home.58 Accordingly, nothing in federal law prevents
the issuers of home mortgages from obtaining negotiable instruments from
53. Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022-23 (1976).
54. See id.
55. See U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a), 3-106 (1991); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-9, at 532 (4th ed. 1995). As Michael Sturley has shown, the
FTC probably did not mean to exclude consumer finance notes from Article 3 entirely, but sim-
ply wanted to preclude holder-in-due-course status. Michael F. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the
Federal Trade Commission's Holder in Due Course Notice on a Negotiable Instrument: How Clever
Are the Rascals at the FTC?, 68 N.C. L. REv. 953, 956-63 (1990). The recently added provisions
discussed in the rest of the paragraph in the text solve that problem by allowing notes covered by
the FTC rule to retain negotiability status as a technical matter.
56. See U.C.C. § 3-106(d) (1991).
57. Id.
58. Although that conclusion is not controversial, extracting it from the FTC regulations
requires a trail through several definitional provisions, starting with 16 C.F.R. § 433.2, which
imposes the notice requirement only on "consumer credit contract[s]." FTC Preservation of
Consumers' Claims and Defenses Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1996). Section 433.1(i) limits that
term to contracts described in sections 433.1(d) ("Purchase money loan[s]") and (e) ("Financing a
sale"). Id. § 433.1(i). Those provisions, in turn, are limited to contracts with a "consumer." Id.
§ 433.1(d), (e). Finally, because the regulatory definition of consumer is limited to a person pur-
chasing goods or services, a person engaged in the purchase of a home is not a consumer for
purposes of the regulation. See id. § 433.1(b) (defining "Consumer" as someone "who seeks or
acquires goods or services for personal, family, or household use").
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borrowers purchasing homes. Given the ubiquitous use of a written docu-
ment to reflect the borrower's obligation to pay, as well as the thriving
secondary market for home-mortgage notes,59 the home-mortgage note
would seem to be the ideal arena for use of negotiability. If negotiability
has faded from the home-mortgage market, negotiability is not likely to
endure much longer in any significant financial market.
But a look at the current operations of the home-mortgage market
reveals two related points: (I) the home-mortgage market in this country has
grown too large and too complicated to rely practically on the transporta-
tion and evaluation of physical documents contemplated by negotiability;
and (II) as the importance of negotiability has faded, the importance of
using negotiable instruments has declined, making it uncommon for home-
mortgage notes to conform to the technical limitations of negotiability.
Thus, the home-mortgage market has replaced negotiability with more
developed liquidity systems-principally devices for pooling and securitizing
the underlying notes-that make the home-mortgage note highly liquid. 60
(1) Obstacles to Negotiability
It is at least plausible to believe that negotiability could work reason-
ably well for a market in which individual mortgage bankers issued loans to
home buyers and then resold each of those loans to one of a limited num-
ber of investors active in their geographic region. The mortgage banker
could indorse each of the promissory notes and then deliver each one to
the investor that purchased that particular note. The investor, in turn,
could hold the promissory note, receive the payments as they became due,
and attend to any miscellaneous business that might arise, such as adminis-
tering any escrow accounts for payment of taxes and insurance, canceling or
returning the note if it was paid in full, or suing the borrower for payment
upon default.
59. More than $100 billion of home mortgages were securitized in the first quarter of 1996
alone. See Karen Talley, Wall Street Watch: Securitization Seen Tapering off Now, Am. BANKER,
Oct. 1, 1996, at 10. That process dominates the supply of money for new mortgages (reaching
64% by the end of 1994) and is slowly converting the body of older outstanding mortgages (cover-
ing 40% of all mortgages outstanding at the end of 1994). KENNETH G. LOVE, MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 1-7
(1996).
60. As Victor Goldberg has pointed out to me, the reputation of the underwriter is a key
element of those liquidity systems, because the underwriters' investment in their reputation
makes it rational for investors to purchase those securities without independent investigation of
the underlying assets.
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The modern home-mortgage market, however, bears little resemblance
to that simple idealized picture. In the first place, the benefits of specializa-
tion have resulted in an almost complete bifurcation of the duties of admin-
istration (referred to as loan servicing) from the benefits of ownership.
Loan servicing generally is performed by separate companies that are paid
by fees deducted from payments on the notes, and that ordinarily have little
or no ownership interest in the notes in question.6' Thus, the party to
whom the homeowner is obligated to make payments no longer owns the
document. That situation is completely at odds with the classic idea of
negotiability as a system in which the maker is obligated to pay whatever
party owns the instrument from time to time.
Furthermore, the process of securitization of home mortgages has re-
sulted in highly complicated ownership structures that render it ridiculous
to focus on "possession" of the instrument by the "owner." In the ordinary
case, many, if not most, home-mortgage notes are packaged shortly after
issuance with a large group of similar notes. In the simplest transaction,
one of the large quasi-governmental entities such as the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac) might purchase the entire
package. Those entities, in turn, would issue a large body of securities
representing minute pro rata ownership interests in each of the promissory
notes covered by the package. The physical notes would not be transferred
to the purchasers of the securities. Instead, they would remain "ware-
housed" at a central storage facility in case of the occurrence of some event
that might require their physical production.62
Nothing about that system resembles the classic system of negotiabil-
ity. The notes are not being transferred by indorsement and delivery.63
Indeed, the ultimate owners of the notes-investors in the securities that
61. See LOVE, supra note 59, at 1-8 ("With mortgages, the original holder generally contin-
ues to service the loan after the sale [to a mortgage securitization pool]."). Indeed, servicing has
become such a completely separate function that the ability to buy and sell mortgage servicing
rights can be seen as "an essential part of the mortgage delivery system." See id. at 1-9.
62. See, e.g., GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSAcTIoNS 452-56 (1993) (summarizing
the mechanics of the secondary mortgage market).
63. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S.2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Memorandum
Submitted by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), 95th Cong. 1136, 1146 (1977) ("To
permit servicing to be conducted effectively and efficiently, the seller will retain unendorsed the
original mortgage notes and the purchaser will not record under the various state recording stat-
utes the purchaser's ownership interest in the [notes that it has] purchased."); Phyllis K. Slesinger
& Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805, 809-10
(1996) (explaining why it is impractical to execute item-by-item assignments in connection with
the packaging and securitization of home-mortgage notes).
the notes support-are extraordinarily unlikely to have any idea whatsoever
as to the actual location of the notes covered by their securities, much less
any information about the individuals liable on those notes. Rather, they
will know only that they have purchased a security bearing a specified
interest rate that is backed up by an interest in a pool of home mortgages of
a specified size, and that is underwritten as being of a specific quality."
(2) The Absence of Negotiability
The irrelevance of negotiability to home-mortgage note transactions is
best demonstrated by the fact that the standard form of promissory note
used for those transactions fails to satisfy the requirements of negotiability.
Because of the strong interest in uniformity in the large securitized home-
mortgage note transactions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
promulgated a number of standard forms for use in those transactions.
Transactions that do not use those forms are not eligible for repurchase by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.65 Accordingly, although a significant num-
ber of home-mortgage notes are not securitized for various reasons, the
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac forms dominate the market, even for transactions
in which the lender does not contemplate an immediate sale to Fannie Mae
or Freddie Mac. 66
The most basic of these forms is the FNMA/FHLMC Multistate Fixed
Rate Note-Single Family. Section 4 of that Note provides as follows:
4. Borrower's Right to Prepay
I have the right to make payments of principal at any time before
they are due. A payment of principal only is known as a "prepay-
ment." When I make a prepayment, I will teU the Note Holder in writing
that I am doing so.
67
The italicized sentence of that provision appears to constitute an "un-
dertaking ... to do a[n] act in addition to the payment of money." For
64. See LOVE, supra note 59, at 4-105 to -106 (describing disclosure of "issue date, maturity,
issuer, coupon rate, and principal balance of the mortgages in the pool"); id. at 4-111 to -114
(describing Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac disclosures related to credit issues, which
do not include any information about individual borrowers, but instead statistical information
about number of loans, range of loan size, geographic location, loan-to-value ratios, insurance
coverage, and information about delinquencies and foreclosures in the pool as a whole).
65. See 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 30, at 316.
66. See id. For example, the note for my home is on the FNMA/FHLMC form even though
it is held by a single investor.
67. FNMA/FHLMC Multistate Fixed Rate Note-Single Family § 4, reprinted in 2 NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 30, at 317, 317.
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historical reasons codified in section 3-104(a)(3) of the U.C.C., a promissory
note cannot be an instrument if it contains such an undertaking: the rules
of negotiability apply only to promises to pay money, not to other, non-
monetary undertakings.' Sending a notice certainly is an act "in addition
to the payment of money," and the note's language seems to constitute an
"undertaking" to perform that act (albeit only on certain conditions). Ac-
cordingly, it seems unlikely that the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac form qualifies
as negotiable. 69 Thus, the rules of Article 3 (including its holder-in-due-
course protections) do not apply.70
Most people to whom I have mentioned that peculiarity find it bizarre.
The requirement that a homeowner send a written notice of prepayment
does not seem crucial to the administration of a mortgage note. After all,
the receipt of a payment that exceeds the required minimum amount
should provide some notice to the servicer. The patron of negotiability
must wonder why any sensible drafter would allow all the wonderful bene-
fits of negotiability to slip away for such a trivial provision.
But the preceding paragraphs offer an obvious answer: the benefits of
negotiability have no practical significance to the operation of the current
system. Parties could take advantage of those benefits only if they were
willing to be careful to obtain indorsements and take possession of each
promissory note that they purchased. Given the practical difficulties that
would accompany any attempt to satisfy those requirements and the uncer-
tain prospects for victory even upon full compliance with the technical
68. For a general discussion of that requirement, see FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C.
HARRELL, supra note 4, 1 2.02[3][a][ii], at 2-19 to -27.
69. Of course, it would be easy for a strong-willed court to ignore the problem and treat the
document as an instrument, reasoning that the clause is not an "undertaking" because the re-
quirement comes into effect only if the borrower voluntarily chooses to make a prepayment.
That line of reasoning seems unlikely to me to persuade most courts. Remember, the issue would
be most likely to arise in the context of a suit by a (presumably not impecunious) holder of the
mortgage note attempting to claim holder-in-due-course status against a homeowner asserting a
defense to payment of the note that would have been valid against the original lender. My sense
is that most courts that let strong-willed preconceptions influence their reasoning are likely to
hold preconceptions favoring the homeowner, not the holder.
70. That is not to say that no home-mortgage notes are covered by Article 3. In fact, it is
quite likely that individual mortgage bankers scattered throughout the country still close home-
mortgage transactions on old standard forms that do not qualify for transfer to Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac. The absence of negotiability from the most widely used forms, coupled with the
market pressure to close loans that are eligible for securitization, however, should steadily drive
those older forms from the market.
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requirements,7' it is far more sensible to leave negotiability by the wayside
in order to pursue the financial advantages promised by access to a large
and highly liquid secondary market. Because the home-mortgage note
market cannot practicably assure the benefits of negotiability, there is no
reason why the parties drafting the notes that the system uses should take
any great care to ensure that the notes retain technical negotiability. Fur-
thermore, the absence of negotiability from the most common form of note
suggests that the parties that draft those notes in fact do not take care to
protect the negotiability of the obligations in question.
2. Private Commercial Obligations
Negotiable instruments are just as hard to find in the commercial
context as they are in the consumer realm discussed above. With respect to
privately placed obligations-the garden-variety commercial promissory
note-the pattern is the same as it is in the home-mortgage market. Not-
withstanding the absence of any overarching legal prohibition, a group of
practical difficulties have made negotiability more trouble than it is worth,
leading to a general absence of negotiability from the forms of instruments
commonly in use.
a. Obstacles to Negotiability
The market for privately placed business obligations presents a situa-
tion that in some ways is diametrically opposed to the home-mortgage
market. In the home-mortgage context discussed above, sales of the notes
are the norm, and retention by the original issuer is an unusual occurrence.
The opposite situation prevails with respect to most private commercial
promissory notes: although not unheard of, sales are relatively unusual
occurrences. Thus, most portfolios appear to be filled almost entirely with
promissory notes issued by the original investor or some closely affiliated
71. Indeed, even if the investors in home-mortgage transactions bothered with the formali-
ties, they would face a substantial risk of losing the benefits of holder-in-due-course status given
the relatively consistent holdings barring holder-in-due-course status for holders that engage in so
many transactions with an originating lender as to be "closely connected" with the originating
lender. See, e.g., LOPUCKI, WARREN, KEATING & MANN, supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 28, at
5, on file with author) (summarizing the doctrinal basis for those holdings).
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party.72 The relative rarity of transfer means that negotiability in this
context would not face the practical difficulties of handling massive num-
bers of transactions that render negotiability so unsuitable for the home-
mortgage market. Unfortunately for the patron of negotiability, however,
the infrequency of transfer also undermines the value of negotiability
because a device that facilitates transfer has little value in a market where
transfer is unusual.
The reason for the rarity of transfer is not hard to discern. 73  As a
detailed empirical study conducted by the Federal Reserve has shown, the
market for private commercial loans (by which I mean loans that will not
be publicly traded) is a very "information-intensive market. '74  Lending to
private commercial borrowers normally entails a considerable factual inves-
tigation of the borrower and any collateral offered to secure the borrower's
obligation to repay the loan.71 Once an investor completes that inves-
tigation and advances funds to the borrower, the initial investor's store of
information about the transaction allows that investor to place a higher
value on the note than any third party. A rational investor purchasing
such a note would have to conduct a second and largely duplicative factual
investigation in order to satisfy itself that the initial investor correctly
evaluated the risks and potential benefits of the transaction. Thus, to the
extent that sales of such notes occur, they tend not to be the sale of an
individual note for which negotiability is helpful,76 but instead bulk sales
of large groups of such notes, frequently in connection with a sale of all or a
72. See Dolan, supra note 10, at 586 ("The note usually sits in the vault of the commercial
lender from the time of utterance until the time it is satisfied and stamped 'paid."').
73. In addition to the general limitations discussed in the text, the securities laws may
prohibit or limit transfer of some kinds of private placements. See MARK CAREY ET AL., THE
EcoNOMICS OF THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT MARKET 43-44 (Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. Staff Study No. 166, 1993) (discussing the market for securities issued under Rule
144A).
74. See id. at i.
75. See id. at 15 ("Borrowers in the private placement market generally are information-
problematic firms or, if they are not, their financings are complex enough that only information-
intensive lenders are willing to buy them."); id. at 3 (characterizing borrowers in the bank-loan
market as "substantially more information problematic" than borrowers in the private-placement
market).
76. Interviews with officers responsible for servicing loans at a major life insurance company
indicate that the only common circumstance in which that lender sells individual promissory
notes is a circumstance in which negotiability has no relevance-a workout with the borrower in
which the note is transferred to a guarantor or some other entity affiliated with the borrower. See
Telephone Interview with Loc McNew, American General Corporation (Aug. 5, 1996); Tele-
phone Interview with Jocelyn Sears, American General Realty Advisers, Inc. (Aug. 5, 1996)
[hereinafter Sears Interview]. It is unlikely that the borrower or its principal purchases its own
promissory note with a view to using holder-in-due-course status to enforce the note.
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substantial portion of the portfolio of the original investor.77 Moreover,
in many cases, such a transaction is effected not through individual trans-
fers of the underlying notes, but through a transfer of the stock of the com-
pany whose portfolio is being sold.7" In sum, the relative infrequency of
item-by-item transfers of private commercial promissory notes limits the
benefits that investors can obtain by ensuring that those instruments are
negotiable in form.
Of course, as long as the notes are sold at all, negotiability at least
theoretically could provide some benefit by enhancing the value of the
notes in the few transactions in which they are sold. But even in those
transactions, commercial parties are unlikely to perceive a substantial bene-
fit to obtaining holder-in-due-course status. Negotiability assumes a trans-
action in which the seller transfers the asset to the purchaser without any
effort by the purchaser to discover the existence of any claims or defenses
that might undermine the borrower's willingness to pay. Any investigation
by the purchaser would put holder-in-due-course status at risk because the
purchaser would be unprotected if its investigation revealed a claim. 7 9
Thus, a purchaser that wishes to rely on holder-in-due-course status should
refrain from inquiry about the promissory note in order to ensure that it
does not discover any existing claims.
Most commercial parties, however, are likely to view that strategy as
something akin to sticking their head in the sand. Commercial actors are
much more likely to adopt a strategy designed to flush out any claims before
acquiring the note. For example, the purchaser might attempt to obtain an
estoppel certificate or an acknowledgment from the borrower evidencing
the borrower's obligation to pay and including a statement that the bor-
rower does not have any defenses to payment.s° Alternatively, the poten-
77. See Telephone Interview with Rembert R. Owen, Jr., American General Realty
Advisers, Inc. (Aug. 7, 1996) [hereinafter Owen Interview]. Informal interviews with bank and
insurance company executives also suggest a burgeoning market for purchases of distressed debt.
Investors who specialize in holding and liquidating questionable loans purchase large packages of
such loans from the portfolios of banks and insurance companies, who are anxious to enhance the
credit quality of their portfolio by disposing of such loans rapidly.
78. See id.
79. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2) (1991).
80. See Sears Interview, supra note 76. An estoppel certificate puts the purchaser in a
better position than holder-in-due-course status because the purchaser is protected from claims
that the note fails negotiability for some technical reason or that the circumstances of the pur-
chaser's acquisition prevents it from acquiring holder-in-due-course status. See supra note 71
(discussing potential for "closely connected" doctrine to deprive institutional lenders of holder-in-
due-course status). Also, less definitively, a purchaser probably would be able to portray itself in a
better light in subsequent litigation to enforce the note if it could show that the borrower dis-
claimed any defenses at the time the purchaser acquired the note than if the purchaser had to
tial purchaser might send a letter to the borrower advising the borrower
that the purchaser is purchasing the note and giving the borrower an oppor-
tunity to raise any defenses that the borrower might have."1 In either
event, however, the purchaser would not be able to use holder-in-due-
course status to defeat any claims that it discovered because it would have
had notice of those claims at the time that it purchased the note. 2 Of
course, it could use holder-in-due-course status to protect itself from claims
that it did not discover in spite of its inquiry, but given the purchaser's
ability to rely on the borrower's express or implicit denial of any defenses, it
seems unlikely that holder-in-due-course status would add any significant
strength to the purchaser's claim.
8 3
b. The Absence of Negotiability
If my analysis of the limited value of negotiability in the commercial
lending context is correct, one would expect to find the same relative lack
of concern about maintaining negotiability in the form of the notes that
appears in the home-mortgage market. To test that thesis, I examined a
number of form promissory notes used by commercial-lending insti-
tutions." None of those promissory notes were unquestionably negoti-
able. The most common problem for negotiability was the presence of a
usury savings clause. The following clause is typical:
Interest paid or agreed to be paid shall not exceed the maximum
amount permissible under applicable law and, in any contingency
whatsoever, if Lender shall receive anything of value deemed interest
under applicable law which would exceed the maximum amount of
interest permissible under applicable law, the excessive interest shall
admit that it was relying on the "technicality" of holder-in-due-course status to defeat any defense
that the borrower might have.
81. See Owen Interview, supra note 77. The potential purchaser might ask the seller to
provide a warranty that the borrower has no defenses to payment. Most institutional investors,
however, would be unwilling to give such a warranty because the possibility of continuing liabil-
ity on the warranty effectively would prevent the investor from treating the note as completely
sold: an investor giving such a warranty would have to accept the possibility that it might have
exposure on the note even after the sale. See Sears Interview, supra note 76.
82. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2)(iii)-(vi) (1991).
83. See supra note 80.
84. I obtained five form promissory notes: three used by insurance companies (American
General Corporation, Travelers Insurance, and an anonymous New York life insurance company)
and two used by depository institutions (Home Savings of America, FSB and NationsBank of
Texas, N.A.). Copies of those forms are available on request.
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be applied to the reduction of the unpaid Amount of Note or re-
funded to Maker.85
Because that provision expressly conditions the maker's obligation to
repay the stated principal and interest on the lawfulness of the negotiated
payment terms, there is a strong argument that it deprives the note of nego-
tiability. Although the previous sentences of the note obligate the
maker to pay a stated sum of principal and interest-a "fixed amount of
money," for purposes of U.C.C. section 3-104(a)-the quoted sentence
renders that obligation conditional because the borrower is obligated to pay
the stated "fixed amount" only if that amount is consistent with applicable
laws. If some aspect of the transaction (perhaps an aspect not evident from
the face of the instrument, such as a loan application fee or other form of
consideration to the lender) renders that fixed amount usurious, 7 no
holder of the note would be entitled to insist upon payment of the fixed
amount stated in the note. Although it is possible to advance plausible
arguments to support negotiability,88 the provision at best places a sub-
stantial cloud on the instrument's negotiability. That cloud would make it
imprudent for any purchaser of such a note to rely on its negotiability.
85. NationsBank of Texas, N.A., Promissory Note (Installment) (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter
NationsBank Note] (on file with author). For similar provisions, see American General Corpora-
tion, Promissory Note § 8, at 4-5 (n.d.) [hereinafter American General Note] (on file with
author); Consolidated Promissory Note 3 (n.d.) [hereinafter New York Insurance Company Note]
(used by anonymous New York life insurance company) (on file with author); The Travelers Insur-
ance Company, Promissory Note § 5.1, at 17 (July 10, 1996) [hereinafter Travelers Note] (on file
with author).
86. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1991) (a negotiable instrument must be "unconditional"); see also
id. § 3-106(a) (defining requirement that a negotiable instrument be unconditional).
87. See LOPUcKI, WARREN, KEATING & MANN, supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 23, at
14-15, on file with author) (discussing that usury problem).
88. For example, one could argue that the provision is irrelevant because it simply restates
what would be implied into the note without the express condition: The maker cannot be forced
to pay unlawful interest. The most obvious problem with that argument is that negotiability law
treats implied conditions and express conditions quite differently. Under U.C.C. section
3-106(a), only express conditions bar negotiability. U.C.C. § 3-106(a) (1991). Thus, the implied
condition limiting payment to amounts lawfully owed would not deprive the note of negotiability
however much it might alter the holder's ability to enforce the letter of the note. By including
an express condition, however, the parties have gone further and thus probably have deprived the
document of negotiability.
Ted Janger has suggested to me that the provision is permissible because it is nothing but a
description of the interest rate, something expressly permitted by U.C.C. section 3-112(b) (1991).
Although that argument is plausible, it is subject to the difficulty that the clause not only limits
the amount of interest to be paid, it also (at least theoretically) would justify the borrower in
withholding a portion of the stated principal amount of the note.
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Although they are the most common problems, usury savings clauses
are not the only provisions that appear in commercial promissory notes that
undermine their negotiability. For example, provisions that require notice
of prepayment like the provision in the Fannie Mae home-mortgage note
are not uncommon, 9 and neither are a variety of other minor provisions
that impose nonmonetary obligations that probably transgress the "courier-
without-luggage" restriction in section 3-104(a)(3) of the U.C.C. The
frequency with which such provisions appear in my sample cannot prove
that no institutional lenders still use negotiable promissory notes, but it
does provide strong support for my view that the parties in the market are
driven by the same forces here as they are in the home-mortgage note con-
text. In sum, the parties that draft both types of notes are not concerned
about satisfying the technical requirements of negotiability because nego-
tiability has no practical significance to the parties that invest in those
obligations.
3. Publicly Traded Commercial Obligations
If the main reason that negotiability has nothing to offer "retail" com-
mercial promissory notes is the difficulty of separating the payment obliga-
tion from the relationship between the borrower and the lender, then it
should be fruitful to turn the search for negotiability to the impersonal
market for publicly traded business obligations, where information about
borrowers is publicly available to all. Here we enter an area where nego-
tiability historically played a large role. Again, however, negotiability's ties
to a rapidly receding historical context have proven its downfall. Although
the end results are similar, the paths to the demise of negotiability have
been slightly different in the market for long-term obligations (bonds) and
short-term obligations (commercial paper). Accordingly, I discuss each of
those topics separately.
89. See Travelers Note, supra note 85, § 3.4(b), at 12.
90. See American General Note, supra note 85, § 10, at 5 (representation by the borrower
that the loan proceeds will be utilized for commercial, investment, or business purposes and not
for personal, family, or household purposes); Home Savings of America, FSB, Promissory Note, at
1 ("Borrower agrees upon Lender's request to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of LOS
ANGELES County, the State of California."); New York Insurance Company Note, supra note
85, at 4-5 (agreement by the borrower that it will be liable for any damages suffered by the lender
because of such matters as environmental liability or the collection by the borrower of rents after
it has received notice of default); Travelers Note, supra note 85, § 5.11(b), at 20 (agreement by




Although bearer bonds once played a large role in our economy, their
demise presents a problem with negotiability not raised by the prior
systems-the conflict between the privacy interests of parties to payment
transactions and the desire of the government to obtain information about
financial transactions. One somewhat fortuitous advantage for the negoti-
able instrument in the twentieth century is that it offers its holder more
privacy than most alternative arrangements. Because the obligor on the
instrument is obligated to pay whomever has possession of the instrument, a
person can acquire a valuable right to payment but maintain anonymity
until the payment actually is due. If the purchaser wishes to keep its iden-
tity anonymous, the obligor might have no record of the parties to whom it
owes money and no way of knowing who those parties are until those par-
ties present the document entitling them to payment.9
That scenario poses significant problems for law enforcement officials.
For example, one industry professional to whom I spoke told a story of a
common device under which a wealthy aging individual would use cash to
purchase bearer bonds that would be placed in a safety-deposit box with the
knowledge of the individual's children. At periodic intervals the individual
would go to the safety-deposit box to remove the coupons from the bonds
and have them transmitted to the issuer to receive the periodic interest
payments. Upon the individual's death, the children would go to the
safety-deposit box, remove the bonds, and sell them without including
them in the decedent's estate. Because the government would not be able
to obtain a record of the decedent's ownership of the bonds from the issuer,
it would be difficult for the government to learn that the bonds had been
transferred to the decedent's children without payment of the appropriate
estate tax.92 The reason that bonds are so valuable for such a scheme is
that they accrue interest while stored in the safety-deposit box; cash would
not. As the individual telling me the anecdote explained: "[A] million
dollars in cash isn't producing any income and the bonds are." 93
91. See Interview with Clayton Erickson, Manager, Municipal Trading and Underwriting,
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., in St. Louis, Mo. 5-6 (Aug. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Erickson Interview]
(describing the inability of an issuer of bonds to give notice to holders of bonds when it calls
them) (transcript on file with author). Indeed, it would be relatively easy to maintain anonymity
even at the time of payment through the simple device of using a reliable intermediary to present
the document evidencing the right to payment.
92. See Erickson Interview, supra note 91, at 6-7.
93. Id. at 7.
979
980 44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 951 (1997)
Congress responded in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982. In connection with the well-known provisions of the tax code that
require payors of interest to report interest payments to the Internal Reve-
nue Service, Congress enacted a provision that effectively outlawed the
issuance of bearer bonds by generally barring any deduction for interest paid
on a publicly traded bearer obligation with a maturity of more than a
year.94 As the legislative history explains, Congress viewed the prohibi-
tion of long-term bearer obligations as a crucial feature of a system allowing
the Internal Revenue Service to monitor ownership of securities and the
profits derived from them.
95
The law appears to have been effective; industry experts to whom I
spoke told me that American companies have not issued bonds in nego-
tiable form since 1982.96 Instead, bonds are issued either in registered
form or by means of a book-entry system, which dispenses with the physical
document entirely and relies on entries made on the books of an agent of
the issuer. 97 The book-entry securities obviously are not negotiable in the
Article 3 sense of the term, because no document represents the payment
obligation.9" Similarly, the registered securities are not negotiable because
they provide on their face that they cannot be transferred by delivery (even
94. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 310(b)(2), 96
Stat. 324, 596-97 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 163(o (1994)).
95. The Senate Report explained:
The committee believes that a fair and efficient system of information reporting and
withholding cannot be achieved with respect to interest-bearing obligations as long as a
significant volume of long-term bearer instruments is issued. A system of book-entry
registration will preserve the liquidity of obligations while requiring the creation of
ownership records that can produce useful information reports with respect to both the
payment of interest and the sale of obligations prior to maturity through brokers. Fur-
thermore, registration will reduce the ability of noncompliant taxpayers to conceal
income and property from the reach of the income, estate, and gift taxes. Finally, the
registration requirement may reduce the volume of readily negotiable substitutes for cash
available to persons engaged in illegal activities.
S. REP. No. 97-494, at 242 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 995.
96. See Telephone Interview with H. Eugene Bradford, Senior Vice President, and
Christopher S. Hillcoat, Senior Vice President, Boatmen's Trust Company Uuly 21, 1996) [here-
inafter Bradford/Hillcoat Interview]; Erickson Interview, supra note 91, at 1-2; Interview with
Daniel A. Naert, First Vice President-Investments, Smith Barney, Inc., in St. Louis, Mo. 1 (Aug.
9, 1996) [hereinafter Naert Interview] (transcript on file with author).
97. See Bradford/Hillcoat Interview, supra note 96; Erickson Interview, supra note 91, at
2-3; Naert Interview, supra note 96, at 1-3.
98. See Bradford/Hillcoat Interview, supra note 96; Naert Interview, supra note 96, at 3.
For purposes of U.C.C. Article 8, book-entry securities are uncertificated securities. See U.C.C.
§ 8-102(a)(18) (1996) (defining "[uincertificated security" as "a security that is not represented by
a certificate").
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with indorsement); a transfer is valid only if registered on the books of the
designated agent of the issuer.99
To be sure, Article 8 allows certain purchasers of registered and book-
entry securities to take free of defenses and adverse claims just as a holder
in due course takes free of defenses and claims to a negotiable instru-
ment.100 But that hardly suggests that Article 8 is a continuing forum for
negotiability. Article 8 offers legal rules to accommodate a system for
liquidity that is as far as possible from the documentary focus of nego-
tiability. Among other things, Article 8 grants "protected-purchaser" status
for documents like registered securities that cannot be transferred solely by
possession.'0' Indeed, Article 8's abandonment of the negotiability sys-
tem is shown most clearly by its willingness to grant protected-purchaser
status even to purchasers that do not have possession of a document repre-
senting rights in the security.'02
The way to make sense of Article 8 is not to attempt to analogize the
nonpossessory rights that it articulates to the legal rules arising from posses-
99. A typical provision states:
mhis Debenture is transferable on the Debenture Register of the Company, upon surren-
der of this Debenture for transfer at the office or agency of the Company in ... duly
endorsed by, or accompanied by a written instrument of transfer in form satisfactory to
the Company and Debenture Registrar duly executed by, the registered Holder hereof or
his attorney duly authorized in writing, and thereupon one or more new Debentures, of
authorized denominations and for the same aggregate principal amount, will be issued to
the designated transferee or transferees.
American Bar Found., Model Debenture Indenture Provisions: All Registered Issues § 202, re-
printed in AMERICAN BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE
PROVISIONS app. C at 13 (1986). 1 reviewed several registered bonds provided by Boatmen's
Trust Company and Smith Barney, Inc. Each of them contained a similar provision. For a sim-
pler standardized provision, see Model Simplified Indenture, 38 BuS. LAW. 741, 776 (1983), which
states that "[t]he Company will pay interest on the Securities ... to the persons who are regis-
tered holders of Securities at the close of business on the record date."
100. See U.C.C. 99 8-202(d), 8-303 (1996).
101. Sections 8-202(d) and 8-303 extend protected-purchaser status to purchasers of a certifi-
cated security. Id. §§ 8-202(d), 8-303. Under section 8-102(a)(4) and 8-102(a)(15)(i), that term
includes registered securities. Id. § 8-102(a)(4), (15)(i).
102. Section 8-202 expressly extends its protection to parties that have only indirect posses-
sion. Id. § 8-202(0. Section 8-303(a)(3) reaches the same result a bit less directly-by protecting
the purchaser so long as it "obtains control of the ... security." Id. § 8-303(a)(3). As the second
paragraph of comment 2 indicates, that test permits the status to extend to holders of un-
certificated securities (book-entry securities for which there is no document to possess). Id.
§ 8-303 cmt. 2. The first paragraph of that comment also allows considerable flexibility in the re-
quirement that the purchaser obtain possession of securities for which there is a certificate. See
id. (explaining that a purchaser can obtain control through delivery under U.C.C. section 8-301,
which is met when an intermediary takes possession "on behalf of" the purchaser).
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sion of negotiable instruments. Instead, the best way to make sense of
Article 8 is to acknowledge that the same practical considerations that
have made negotiability impractical for home-mortgage notes have rendered
negotiability impractical for corporate bonds.'0 3 The basic problem is the
immense growth in the market for securities, which results in a volume of
trading unheard of even a few decades ago.' 4  In an era of negotiable
documents, each trade would be closed by a physical transfer of the relevant
document from one broker to the other. Industry experts remember (with
little fondness) armies of couriers scurrying up and down Wall Street in the
late afternoon carrying immense numbers of securities to settle the day's
trades.'05
The advent of electronic information systems provided an opportunity
to develop a system for transferring securities that dispensed with the prob-
lems raised by the document-centered transfer mechanisms of the negoti-
ability system. Not surprisingly, the industry has created a system that
relies increasingly on central depositories (usually Depository Trust Com-
pany, commonly referred to as DTC) to hold the share certificates: transfers
are made not by transportation of pieces of paper, but by electronic mes-
sages to the depository that alter the records of the depository. Accord-
ingly, the owner need not obtain possession of the security, and thus the
security need not be moved from place to place. The reasons may be
slightly different from those discussed in the preceding sections, but the end
result is the same. The financial institutions and practices have moved
beyond the transactions for which negotiability was designed, developing
new mechanisms for transfer in which documents are a hindrance rather
than an aid.
103. For a thorough discussion of Article 8 and a thoughtful effort to justify its rules by refer-
ence to the modem trading system for which Article 8 was designed, see James Steven Rogers,
Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1431 (1996).
104. To get an idea from stock trading, trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange
was in the range of ten million shares per day during the "paperwork crunch" of the 1960s,
which required the exchange to close periodically to catch up on the paperwork necessary for an
era that relied on physical transfers of share certificates. See Erickson Interview, supra note 91, at
7 (describing the need to close the New York Stock Exchange on Wednesdays to accommodate
12 million trades per day). Volume in more recent years has exceeded 600 million shares per day
without taxing the modem nondocumentary transfer systems. See Rogers, supra note 103, at
1445.
105. See Erickson Interview, supra note 91, at 7 ("A hundred runners running through Wall
Street with briefcases making deliveries was not the answer.").
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b. Commercial Paper
The last major credit system discussed in this Part is commercial paper,
which presents perhaps the most interesting scenario-an almost complete
abandonment of negotiability in the face of a legal system that at least
nominally continues to demand negotiability."°  Although legal aca-
demics frequently use the term "commercial paper" generically to describe
all types of commercial negotiable instruments, 1°7 its meaning in the fi-
nancial markets is quite different. In modem markets, references to com-
mercial paper describe a specific type of short-term obligation issued by
highly credit-worthy companies.'O' The key boundary to the market is
formed by the provision of section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 that
exempts from the Securities Act certain promissory notes with a maturity of
less than nine months." 9 Large credit-worthy corporations frequently use
those notes-known as commercial paper-to satisfy a significant part of
their companies' financing needs."0
At first glance, the applicable legal rules suggest (in accordance with
the common legal usage mentioned above) that commercial paper does
provide a significant continuing market for negotiability. The Securities
and Exchange Commission Release that refines the terms of the section
3(a)(3) exemption states that the exemption is limited "to prime quality
106. The tax code provision that bars deductions for interest on bonds does not apply to
commercial paper because, as discussed below, commercial paper always has a maturity of less
than nine months. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(f(2)(A)(iii) (1994) (prohibition on interest deduction
does not apply to bearer obligations with a maturity of "not more than 1 year").
107. See, e.g., NICKLES, supra note 4 (study aid on "Negotiable Instruments and Other Re-
lated Commercial Paper"); NICKLES ET AL., supra note 3 (casebook on "Modem Commercial
Paper"); CHARLES M. WEBER & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, COMMERCIAL PAPER IN A NUTSHELL at
xix (3d ed. 1982) ("As used in the title and throughout the book, 'commercial paper' refers to
promissory notes, drafts, checks and certificates of deposit-the subject matter of Article 3.").
108. For a general discussion of the commercial-paper market, see MARCIA L. STIGUM, THE
MONEY MARKET 1023-82 (3d ed. 1990).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1994).
110. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Thomas Larson, Associate General Counsel,
Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. 1 (Aug. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Larson Interview] (stating that
Anheuser-Busch has about $1 billion in commercial paper outstanding) (transcript on file with
author); Interview with Harley M. Smith, Assistant General Counsel, and Judith C. Rebholz,
Manager-Cash & Short Term Funding, Emerson Electric Co., in St. Louis, Mo. (Sept. 11, 1996)
[hereinafter Smith/Rebholz Interview] (describing Emerson Electric Co.'s $500-million
commercial-paper portfolio).
negotiable commercial paper.""' The leading securities-law commentators
have taken that statement seriously, suggesting that it imposes a specific
requirement that all commercial paper be negotiable."' But a closer ex-
amination of the materials suggests that the statement should not be taken
at face value. Rather, the Release appears to demand negotiability only in
the sense of free transferability. It does not seem to refer to negotiability in
the technical Article 3 sense. For example, Professors Loss and Seligman
state that "the requirement of negotiability is not of much consequence,"
"[b]ecause there is little secondary trading in commercial paper."" 3 Simi-
larly, Professor Lowenstein states: "Because there is not a significant sec-
ondary market in commercial paper, the requirement of negotiability does
not appear to be a legal factor that issuers need consider.'.. That view
was confirmed to me in a telephone interview with an attorney working in
the relevant office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. He
explained: "When we say 'negotiable,' the key is that it has to be transfer-
able.o'' 5
The limited force of any legal requirement of negotiability is evident
from the practices of commercial-paper issuers. First, although at one time
commercial paper tended to be issued in bearer form,"6 issuers for some
time have issued paper in registered form, which would not satisfy technical
"negotiability" requirements."' More significantly, although a few issuers
apparently still issue physical pieces of paper, 18 the clear trend in the in-
dustry is toward paperless paper, where electronic communications handle
all issuance, sale, and transfer of the "paper." 119 In that system, the issuer
111. Securities Act Release No. 4412, reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 2045-2046
(Sept. 20, 1961) (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., 3 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.B.3, at 1190
(1989); Paul Lowenstein, The Commercial Paper Market and the Federal Securities Laws, 4 CORP. L.
REV. 128, 142 (1981).
113. 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 112, at 1190.
114. Lowenstein, supra note 112, at 142.
115. Telephone Interview with Joseph Babitch, Office of the Chief Counsel, Division of
Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 28, 1996).
116. See STIGUM, supra note 108, at 1024-26 (reproducing commercial paper characterized as
"bearer" paper, which states that it is payable "to the order of" the investor).
117. As explained above, supra note 99 and accompanying text, registered obligations are by
definition not negotiable because they cannot be transferred by delivery and indorsement.
118. One industry professional suggested that General Electric and General Motors Accep-
tance Corporation still currently issue their commercial paper in documentary form. Erickson
Interview, supra note 91, at 11.
119. The following summary of the procedures for issuing commercial paper is based on the
Smith/Rebholz Interview, supra note 110, and on the Larson Interview, supra note 110, at 7, as
well as a sample set of commercial-paper documents that I obtained from Anheuser-Busch Com-
panies, Inc. in connection with the Larson Interview. Copies of those documents are available
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enters into an arrangement with a central recordkeeping depository (nor-
mally DTC), under which DTC maintains a central electronic record of all
of the issuer's outstanding commercial paper. Each day when the issuer
wishes to issue commercial paper, its investment bank attempts to locate
entities that wish to invest in the paper. Before noon, the issuer, invest-
ment bank, and investors agree upon the major terms of the transaction-
the amount, interest rate, and date of maturity-and send the necessary
data on to the issuer's paying agent (normally a New York bank such as
Chemical Bank). The paying agent in turn sends an electronic message to
DTC describing the purchases the investors have made. DTC's record of
those purchases is the definitive record of the obligation. The investor's
interest plainly is not negotiable because the issuer does not provide any
separate promissory note payable to each individual investor. The only
promissory note involved in the transaction is a master note from the issuer
to Cede & Co. (DTC's street nominee) covering the issuer's entire commer-
cial-paper program.
In sum, whatever role negotiability once might have played in the
commercial-paper market, the same pressures that have limited the use of
negotiability for bonds are pushing commercial paper inevitably to the same
end result-an electronic transfer system in which any document is a mere
vestige of former practices that have become obsolete in the face of the
pressures of increasing volume and new technology.
III. THE IRRELEVANCE OF NEGOTIABILITY TO THE
MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEM
Part II illustrated a wide variety of developments that have limited the
use of negotiable instruments in most contexts, but it could not show that
negotiable instruments have disappeared entirely. In addition to whatever
scattered usages of negotiability might persist in odd comers of the financial
marketplace, one major payment system remains in which the payment
continues to be evidenced by a negotiable instrument-the checking sys-
tem.
But the continued use of negotiable instruments in the checking sys-
tem does not suggest that negotiability has any continuing significance.
Rather, negotiability has little or no role in the practices by which pay-
ments are made and collected in the checking system. Although the sys-
on request. Except for the mechanics of issuance, the system closely resembles the ordinary
system for book-entry securities discussed in detail in Rogers, supra note 103, at 1443-45.
tem has retained the technical form of negotiability, it has abandoned in
practice all of the major concepts by which negotiability can facilitate
transactions. The reason for this change should be clear by now: In the
modem checking system, negotiability is not an aid to the effectiveness of
the system, but an obstacle for the industry to overcome. 2
A. Reliance on the Physical Object
The central premise of negotiability is that assets can be transferred
more readily in a system that allows a physical object to represent all rights
in the assets. As Part I explained, all of the benefits that negotiability
offers arise from the system's use of the document as the ultimate indicator
of rights in the assets. The clearest evidence of the true irrelevance of
negotiability to the checking system is the growing push to adopt "trun-
cated" processing devices that rid the system of the physical document as
much as possible.
The checking system faces the same technological pressures as the
various payment and credit systems discussed in Part II, but it must deal
with those pressures on a canvas of daunting size, in a system called upon to
process more than sixty billion checks a year.12 The absurdity of reliance
on the physical document is evidenced by the need for the banks where
checks are deposited (depositary banks) to sort those checks and then have
them transported (normally by truck or airplane) to locations designated by
the various banks on whom the checks are drawn (the payor banks).'
One study concludes that the current collection process expends approxi-
mately 2.5 cents to process each paper check,'23 but the costs can be
much higher. For instance, the Federal Reserve in some cases may charge
120. My conclusion is similar in some respects to the argument presented by Jim Rogers in
his work in this area. We both argue that negotiability concepts have no relevance to the mod-
em checking system. See Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instruments Concepts, supra note 5.
My argument, however, is considerably broader, because it rests more on the physical attributes of
the system than on the legal developments on which Rogers focuses.
121. See 1 BANKERS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 36, fig.25, at 53 (reporting statistics).
122. My description of the check-collection process is based on two site visits to check-
processing centers. The first was a March 7, 1996 visit to the check-processing center for the
First National Bank of Chicago [hereinafter First Chicago Site Visit]. (Because my tour at First
Chicago was conducted by several different people, it is not practical to attribute information to
any particular individual.) The second site visit was a September 18, 1996 visit to the check-
processing center for the Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, where I received a tour con-
ducted by William W. Barks, Assistant Vice President [hereinafter Boatmen's Site Visit].
123. Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long
Strange Trip It's Been, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 55, 69 (1995).
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more than twenty-five cents per check.2 4 The fact is, in the checking
system just as much as in any other payment system, the notion of central-
izing legal rights in the physical document is no longer the benefit it might
have been centuries ago: It is an albatross that drags down the entire sys-
tem.
The key intellectual challenge is to realize that however central the
"document" might be to a negotiability-based system, there is no reason for
the checking system to continue to operate a document-based system for
collection of checks. The collection process needs to facilitate two actions
by the payor bank: a decision whether to honor the check; and transmis-
sion of payment or notice of dishonor to the depositary bank. Given the
capabilities of existing technology, physically transporting the check from
place to place is not the simplest way to perform those two functions. It
makes much more sense and should be dramatically cheaper in the long run
to perform those functions electronically-by a transmission from the depos-
itary bank to the payor bank advising of the deposit of the check; and a
return transmission from the payor bank agreeing or declining to honor the
check.2 5  Indeed, the inevitability of the demise of the paper-based pro-
cessing system has been obvious for so long that the revisers of Article 4 in
the 1980s took several conscious steps to give the statute the flexibility to
accommodate the truncated electronic system that should replace the cur-
rent system over the next few decades.2 6
Indeed, the beginnings of a truncated system already are in place. In
1994, some form of electronic presentment was used for over 650 million
checks, which was just over one percent of the total volume.' For
checks cleared through the Federal Reserve system, truncation is even more
124. Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122 (describing per-item charges by the Federal Reserve
Bank in St. Louis that go as high as 27 cents).
125. Of course, a truncated system need not require a return transmission from the payor
bank agreeing to honor the check. Like the current system, the system instead could assume that
the payor bank will pay all checks unless it sends a contrary notice within some specified time.
In my view, a system requiring a return message expressing a decision to honor or dishonor would
be likely to expedite the system. Similar messages are characteristic in those systems that already
rely on electronic presentment. See LOPUCKI, WARREN, KEATING & MANN, supra note 3
(manuscript assign. 18, at 3-4, on file with author) (describing authorization of payment in debit-
card transactions); id. (manuscript assign. 19, at 3, on file with author) (describing authorization of
payment in credit-card transactions).
126. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-101 cmt. 2 (1991) (discussing need for flexibility).
127. ECP: Gateway to Truncation, CORPORATE EFT REPORT, May 31, 1995, at 5 (reporting
that electronic presentment doubled to about 650 million items in 1994). Electronic presentment
need not involve complete truncation. As discussed below with respect to electronic cash letters,
electronic presentment often still requires the depositary bank to forward the paper checks to the
payor bank. See id.
common, in the range of two percent of all checks.' Under that system,
the check stops when it reaches the depositary bank. Instead of transmit-
ting the check to the payor bank or an intermediary, the payor bank creates
a record of the check, either a photographic image or a digital record of the
relevant data. 9 The depositary bank then transmits an electronic mes-
sage seeking collection. 30 Depending on the agreement between the
parties (or, perhaps more likely in the future, on standardized rules imple-
mented by the Federal Reserve), the message might consist of the entire
image or simply include data summarizing relevant facts about the check,
such as the payor bank, account number, amount, date, and payee. Ideally,
the message would be sent directly to the payor bank, but currently many of
those transactions still pass through an intermediary such as the Federal
Reserve.'31
The payor bank receiving the message has the same options as it has
under the conventional paper-based clearing process-it can honor the
check or dishonor it. If it chooses to dishonor the check, it advises the
depositary bank electronically of its decision. 132  If the payor bank
chooses to honor the check, it has no obligation to do anything. 133  At
the end of the month, the payor bank cannot return the actual checks to
its customers because those checks are still at the depositary bank. There-
fore, it sends its customers either images of the checks (much like the
images of credit-card slips that come with American Express bills) or
128. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, CHECK PROCESSING/ HOLESALE OPERATIONS:
RESULTS OF 1994 INDUSTRY SURVEY 13 (1994).
129. Banks already create photographic images when they process checks to enable them to
reconstruct a check in the event that the paper object is lost or destroyed during the collection
process. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122; First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122.
Some banks also create digital records as well, although that technology is only now becoming
widely used. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122 (describing electronic cash letters).
130. See U.C.C. § 4-110 (1991) (permitting a depositary bank to transmit "an image of an
item or information describing the item ... rather than ... the item itself"); Availability of
Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC), 12 C.F.R. § 229.36(c) (1996) (permitting a
bank to "present a check to a paying bank by transmission of information describing the check in
accordance with an agreement with the paying bank").
131. See ECCS May Significantly Improve Check Collection, CORPORATE EFT REPORT, May 5,
1993, at 1-3 (describing electronic presentment services offered by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis).
132. See U.C.C. § 4-301(a)(2) (1991) (permitting written notice of dishonor rather than re-
turn "if the item is unavailable for return"); 12 C.F.R. § 229.31(0 (permitting return of a copy of
a check "[i]f a check is unavailable for return").
133. As discussed above, it probably would be better for the system in the long run to require
payors to send a return message honoring the check contemporaneously with presentment. See
supra note 125.
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detailed statements describing the transactions reflected by the checks."3 4
Finally, the depositary bank retains the image of the check for a period of
time sufficient to resolve disputes that might arise.135
The outmoded nature of the document-based processing system is
made even clearer by the burgeoning use of electronic cash letters, also
known as electronic presentment. 136  In that system, a depositary bank
runs checks through a machine that produces a computer file containing
the relevant information about the checks and sends that file directly to the
payor bank by electronic mail. The payor bank then must decide on an
expedited basis whether it wishes to honor or dishonor the checks. In
accordance with customary practice, the paper copies of the check are
transmitted later by ordinary procedures. Because the payor bank has made
and communicated all of the relevant decisions long before the paper
checks arrive at the depositary bank, the transportation of those checks
expends a great deal of resources for no useful purpose.'37 The physical
transportation of the checks, the last surviving vestige of negotiability,
should succumb to budgetary pressures in the immediate future.
But there is more at stake here than cost savings. An electronic sys-
tem is not only cheaper than a document-based system, it should be much
faster as well. An electronic presentment system should be able to clear
checks nationwide on a same-day or same-hour basis, so that check recipi-
ents would receive final payment almost immediately upon deposit. The
skeptic should consider how easily banks are able to process electronic
payments made by debit cards. Although there are some differences, there
is no fundamental reason why the system could not develop so that payor
banks respond with the same promptness to payment directions made by
way of check as they presently do to payment directions made by way of a
debit card.
134. See 1 BANKERS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 36, at 54 (discussing plans for image statement
processing and for truncated statements); Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122 (same).
135. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122 (stating that the bank retains the information
for seven years); see also U.C.C. § 4-406(b) & cmt. 3 (1996) (discussing the relation between
check retention plans and the obligation of a payor bank to provide canceled checks to its cus-
tomers).
136. My description of electronic cash letters is based on the Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note
122. For a similar but less detailed account, see ECP May Be Best for Now, CORPORATE EFT
REPORT, May 31, 1995, at 5.
137. The reason the checks are transported is that the payor bank could not allow the depos-
itary bank to abandon transportation of the checks and move to complete truncation unless the
payor bank was willing to give up the capability of providing its customers canceled checks with
their statements. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122.
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Of course, an electronic system would impose some costs on the enti-
ties that wrote checks, because they would lose the "float" they gain in the
current system during the time that passes between their writing a check
and the removal of the funds from their account. Unfortunately, however
fond of float we may be as individuals, a system in which expedited process-
ing minimizes the float available to check writers should improve the
checking system as a whole by increasing the value of the check as a pay-
ment system. Presently, a merchant gets paid more when it gets immediate
cash than when it gets a check, both because it gets use of the funds earlier,
and because payment is far more certain. And the increase in certainty
means that a system that provides contemporaneous clearing does some-
thing more than transfer the time value of the float from the consumer
writing the check to the merchant that receives it. By increasing the cer-
tainty of collection, contemporaneous clearing lowers the costs of collec-
tion and thus increases the effectiveness of the system as a whole. 3 '
The ability of the system to develop such a completely electronic
collection system does not prove the irrelevance of the document-based
negotiability system, for current procedures still transport tens of billions of
checks for physical collection each year. Nevertheless, the potential for a
development that would eliminate physical collection entirely strongly
suggests that the concept of negotiability no longer plays any useful role in
the system. The following subparts illustrate that point by explaining the
two main ways in which negotiability concepts have faded from the check-
ing system in current practice.
B. Signatures as a Device for Transferring Title and Accepting Liability
As discussed in Part I, one of the central benefits that negotiability
offers is the simplification of title transfer procedures that arises from a
system in which title is transferred by delivery of the document, supple-
mented only by inscription on the document of any necessary signatures.
Article 3 codifies those principles of negotiability with an elegant array of
rules that describe what types of signatures are effective to transfer complete
138. Absent some other change to the system, contemporaneous clearing would harm con-
sumers not only by depriving them of the float they currently have, but also by limiting their
ability to stop payment. That problem, however, is not inevitable. As the credit-card system
shows, it is possible for a system to provide a merchant substantially contemporaneous payment
and also provide the purchaser a realistic ability to stop payment at a later date.
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title to a negotiable instrument 39 and create a complex set of liabilities
on the instrument depending on the type of signature.'4°
As it happens, however, those rules have little influence on the
mechanics of the check-collection process, largely because of the impracti-
cality of determining the validity of a purported signature. Instead, for the
most part the system in practice ignores the signatures (or the absence of
signatures) and relies on other more effective mechanisms for limiting losses
from theft and fraud.
1. Indorsements
I start with the simpler topic: the mechanisms for evaluating the trans-
fers of an instrument that was validly issued. Under the classic principles of
negotiability, a party that receives an instrument payable to order (such as a
check) can transfer full rights in the instrument only by signing the instru-
ment.' Thus, the principles of negotiability contemplate a process in
which a party acquiring an instrument examines the instrument in order to
determine whether the required indorsements are present and then requires
the transferor of the instrument to provide any necessary indorsement that
is not already present.
In practice, however, many banks find it impractical to examine each
check to determine if the appropriate indorsements are present. To be sure,
an employee who examines a check presented for cashing or deposit at a
teller window might, and probably should, examine the check to see if the
appropriate indorsement appears to be present. If the indorsement is not
present, the employee can ask the person at the window to add the required
indorsement. As a practical matter, however, tellers frequently fail to
examine checks presented for deposit.'42
139. U.C.C. §§ 3-204 to -207, 3-401 to -403 (1991).
140. Id. §§ 3-409, 3-412 to -415.
141. Without the indorsement, the purchaser of the instrument cannot become a holder
because the seller would remain the identified person to whom the instrument is payable, see id.
§ 1-201(20) (1996), and thus, cannot become a holder in due course. See id. § 3-302(a) (1991) (a
holder in due course must be a holder). To be sure, the transferee without an indorsement does
acquire some rights in the instrument under U.C.C. section 3-203(b), including the right to
enforce it under U.C.C. section 3-301(11), but that package of rights is distinctly less than the
rights as a holder in due course that it could acquire with an indorsement. See id. § 3-203 cmt. 2
(discussing the procedural disadvantages of failing to obtain holder status on acquisition of an
instrument).
142. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122 (noting that tellers are particularly unlikely to
notice missing indorsements on checks presented with deposits that contain numerous items).
Moreover, an increasingly large share of deposits are made at auto-
matic teller machines where the depositary bank cannot readily seek the
appropriate indorsement. 4 3  Indeed, banks are encouraging customers to
use remote deposit locations in order to save on the substantial1" costs
that banks incur in receiving deposits directly through tellers. 4 ' In that
context, the bank cannot simply ask for the indorsement; it would have to
return the check to the customer to obtain the indorsement. Although
some banks do return those checks, many do not. Instead, even if they
notice the absence of the indorsement, many banks simply process the
check without the indorsement.'4"
Common financing practices also make reliance on the indorsement
requirement impractical. For example, one common practice requires
borrowers to have their customers mail payments not to the borrower, but
directly to a depositary bank for deposit to a "lockbox" account. That
account technically is in the borrower's name, but the depositary bank
ordinarily has agreed to prevent the borrower from removing funds from the
lockbox without the lender's permission. The idea is that the lender can
limit the borrower's ability to misuse funds it receives from its business if
the lender can cause the funds to be deposited directly into an account
from which the borrower cannot readily obtain the funds. In the lockbox
scenario, the checks will have come straight from the depositor's customers,
so none of them will bear indorsements by the customer. 4
7
Banks would be within their rights in refusing to take unindorsed
checks and instead returning them to their customers. But two obvious
reasons justify the common (though not universal) practice of accepting the
checks. First, however central the indorsement may be to negotiating the
check in the abstract, the bank in practice has little to gain by wasting the
143. See Janice Fioravante, Marching to 2000 with a Range of Functions, Am. BANKER, Nov.
27, 1995, at 6A (reporting that about 15% of bank customers make deposits at ATMs).
144. One industry source recently estimated the cost of a teller deposit transaction at almost
three times the cost of an ATM deposit transaction (75 cents versus 27 cents). See Technology:
Shift a Gear, BANKER, Nov. 1, 1995, at 94, available in 1995 WL 9701387.
145. See Denise Duclaux, How to Handle Fees? Very Carefully, AM. BANKING J., June 1996, at
32, 32-33 (reporting that within a month of the bank's imposing a three-dollar fee on deposits
made at teller windows, customer deposits at First National Bank of Chicago ATMs doubled, and
that ATM deposits have risen by another fifty percent since then, even though the teller-deposit
fee subsequently was reduced to $1.50).
146. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122; First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122. In
response to skeptical comments by several readers of drafts of the Article, I tested the practice
empirically in February and March of 1997 by the simple device of making several ATM deposits
into my personal banking account that included unindorsed checks. In each case the depositary
bank processed the check without inquiry or a request for indorsement.
147. See U.C.C. § 4-205 cmt. (1995).
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time and effort that would be necessary to obtain its customer's indorse-
ment. Because the payor bank is unlikely to check for the presence of an
indorsement before deciding whether to honor the check, the absence of
the indorsement is unlikely to affect the payor's decision whether to honor
the check." s If the check in fact clears, as the overwhelming majority of
checks do,149 the absence of an indorsement will be irrelevant unless the
drawer subsequently challenges the depositor's right to the funds. Nor will
the absence of an indorsement harm the depositor bank in the unusual
event that the check does not clear, because the bank's right to charge the
bounced check back to its depositor does not depend on the depositor's
having indorsed the check.5
The second reason arises from the first. Recognizing the impracticality
of requiring customer indorsements (especially in the lockbox situation), the
drafters of the revised Article 4 in the 1980s added a relatively obscure
provision to Article 4 (U.C.C. section 4-205) that creates an exception to
the indorsement requirement for checks. Under that provision, if a cus-
tomer that is a holder of an item deposits it at its bank without the required
indorsement, the bank becomes a holder of the item even if the customer
neglects to make the indorsement.' Thus, the brief phrasing of U.C.C.
section 4-205 effectively removes the indorsement requirement from the
ordinary course of check processing. The fact that the provision has gained
so little attention only demonstrates the irrelevance of the indorsement:
enactment of that provision only reflected the obsolescence of the indorse-
ment; it did not cause it.
That provision does not completely vitiate the need for a bank to
consider indorsements, because it only forgives the absence of an indorse-
ment of the customer. If the customer is not a holder at the time of the
deposit (most likely because the customer obtained the check without
obtaining an indorsement from the prior holder), then the bank will not
148. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122; First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122.
149. A recent industry survey suggests that the rate of clearance is about 99.4% at large
banks (that is, that 0.60% of processed checks are returned), but drops to about 98.5% for small
banks. AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 128, tbl.33, at 37. Those statistics are consistent
with the estimate I received at one of the banks I visited. The officer guiding me around the
processing center estimated that only 10,000 checks are returned each day out of the 1,700,000
checks that the bank processes, a return rate of less than two-thirds of one percent. See
Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122.
150. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122 (explaining that the right to charge back the
check justifies the bank's willingness to process the check notwithstanding the absence of the
indorsement); see also Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instir'rents Concepts, supra note 5, at
943-46 (discussing the depositary bank's rights to charge back a dishonored check).
151. U.C.C. § 4-205(1) (1995).
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become a holder even under the lenient rules of Article 4. That scenario,
however, is not common, because the overwhelming majority of checks are
deposited directly by the original named payees; only a small percentage of
checks are transferred before deposit. 5' In any event, for the reasons out-
lined above, banks are relatively unlikely to reject a check for deposit solely
because it is deposited into an account that bears a name different from the
name of the payee identified on the check.'
In sum, the central place of indorsements in transferring title and
allocating liability for negotiable instruments has no significant role in the
modem check-processing system. Checks are deposited, processed for col-
lection, and paid without any significant attention to the presence or
absence of the indorsements required by Article 3.
2. Drawers' Signatures
The absence of a drawer's signature is more serious than the absence of
an indorsement because an instrument that does not have a valid signature
of the purported drawer is completely invalid. Thus, unlike the situation
with indorsements, it is much less common for the check-processing system
consciously to accommodate checks that do not even purport to bear the
drawer's signature.
But whatever the problem, it is not practicable for the payor bank to
rely on a verification of the physical signature as a predicate for determin-
ing whether it will honor the check. The biggest problem is the sheer
volume of checks that a payor bank must process. A large check-processing
center will receive something on the order of one million checks each
152. Although it is difficult to obtain precise statistics, a general idea of the relative rarity
with which checks are transferred before they are deposited can be obtained by comparing the
size of the commercial check-cashing industry (estimated at 128 million checks in 1990) with the
total volume of checks (55 billion during that same year): less than one-quarter of one percent.
See JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKI"NG: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE
POOR 64 (1994) (reporting that the commercial check-cashing industry cashed 128 million checks
in 1990); 1 BANKERS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 36, at 53 (reporting a total volume of 55.3 billion
checks in 1990). Two of my colleagues offered interesting anecdotes on that point. Leila Wexler
explained to me that the personal checks normally offered by banks in France come preprinted in
a "barred" form that prohibits negotiation of the check except in connection with a deposit by
the named payee. Similarly, Lynn LoPucki told me of a cash-management account that a stock
brokerage firm offers as a checking-account substitute. That account accepts checks for deposit
only if the depositor is the named payee; it does not accept third-party checks.
153. See supra note 146.
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day. 54 It would take an army of signature examiners to compare the sig-
natures on that many checks with the signature cards'55 for the relevant
accounts. To be sure, some small banks still verify signatures on the checks
their customers write. 156 More commonly, however, banks limit signature
verification to a small group of the checks that they receive.'5' For exam-
ple, one of the processing centers that I visited examines the signatures on
20,000 checks per day, less than one-half of one percent of the checks that
it receives. 158  Thus, although 20,000 checks per day might seem like a
large number in the abstract, that sample is highly unlikely to include all of
the fraudulently issued checks: the payor bank's evaluation of more than
99.5% of the checks proceeds without any examination at all of the draw-
er's signature.' 59
The difficulty of determining whether a signature is valid heightens
the impracticality of examining signatures. Absent a striking lack of com-
petence, a forger with a sample of a valid signature should be able to pro-
vide a signature that would pass muster even if the check is in the small
sample a bank chooses for examination. 160 Thus, the bank cannot be
154. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122 (reporting that it processes about 1,700,000
checks per business day); First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122 (reporting commercial process-
ing alone of 500,000-700,000 checks per business day).
155. The enormity of the task of examining signatures is magnified by the elaborate signature
cards for large commercial enterprises, which describe dozens of people that have varying levels of
authority on various accounts. See First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122.
156. See AMERIcAN BANKERS ASW'N, supra note 128, tbl.55, at 45 (reporting survey indi-
cating that 33% of small banks, but only 7.3% of medium banks and 1.7% of large banks, verify
signatures on all checks).
157. Banks understandably are reluctant to offer specifics about how they select checks for
signature verification, but most appear to rely on some combination of random sampling, dollar
size of check, source of deposit, type of account, and requests from their customers. See id.
(reporting results of survey on signature-verification criteria); Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note
122; First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122.
158. See First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122. The process for examining checks that I
observed at First Chicago is impressively efficient: each examiner examines about 3500 items per
day. As mentioned above, the examiners do not examine the checks to determine if they appear
to bear the required indorsements; they look only at the drawer's signatures. See First Chicago
Site Visit, supra note 122.
159. The 20,000 checks per day works out to about 5,000,000 checks per year. During the
previous year, the bank's examination of 5,000,000 checks identified 500 forgeries for a total of
$1.5 million. See First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122. Discovery of those forgeries may have
justified the cost of the operation, but it cannot plausibly be thought to have captured all of the
fraudulently issued checks.
160. To be sure, in many cases a legitimate business that takes a check may require the per-
son writing the check to present identification to verify the check writer's identity. That prac-
tice, however, does not protect the bank at all against the common scheme in which a forger
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sure that the signature is valid even on the few checks that it does exam-
ine. 161
In the end, banks are faced with a reality in which the signature pro-
vides little significant protection against losses from fraud. To have any
realistic protection against those losses, banks must move beyond negoti-
ability and develop other, nonsignatory devices to protect themselves. The
most prominent of those devices are systems in which the drawer of the
check directly authorizes payment so that the payor bank can rely on that
authorization rather than the signature. For example, consider the "posi-
tive-pay" system of check verification that is coming into common use for
large business accounts. 62 In that system, the bank provides its customer
with a software package that allows the customer to send the bank a com-
puter file at the close of each business day that describes each check that
the customer has issued. When checks are presented to the bank for pay-
ment, the bank can rely on computerized sorting and analysis of the checks
to determine if the checks presented for payment match checks described in
the daily transmissions. If the checks are described in those transmissions,
then the payor bank need not examine the signature on the check because
the bank has something better than a signature to evidence the drawer's
willingness to pay-a direct electronic message from the customer verifying
its willingness to pay. Conversely, a check that is not described in the
transmissions can be dishonored even if it is such an excellent forgery that
it appears on its face to be a validly issued check. 63
It is encouraging that the checking system has begun to move beyond
reliance on the signature and to develop nonsignatory devices for verifying
writes a check payable to itself, drawn on the account of some innocent third party, deposits the
forged check in its own account, and absconds with the funds when the payor bank mistakenly
honors the check.
161. For a general discussion of the relative difficulty of determining that a physical signature
is valid, see Benjamin Wright, Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of Electronic Signatures 1-3(visited Feb. 16, 1997) <http://www.ssm.com/cyberlaw/lawpaper.html>.
162. A recent survey by the American Bankers Association suggests that positive-pay systems
are gaining popularity rapidly, especially with large banks. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, 1994
ABA CHECK FRAUD SuRvEY 66 (1994) (reporting results of 1993 survey indicating that positive-
pay systems were being marketed by 54.5% of large banks, but by only 6.5% of medium-sized
banks and 2% of small banks).
163. My description of positive-pay systems rests on conversations during my visit to First
National Bank of Chicago. See First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122. Boatmen's Bank does
not yet use positive-pay systems, although it does use a similar system described as "pay-on-issue"
authorization. In that system, the bank sends an electronic message to designated customers each
day describing the checks that have been presented for payment. The customers compare the
checks listed in the message to the checks that they have authorized and indicate, to the bank
directly which checks should be honored and dishonored. Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122.
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the drawer's authorization of the instrument. But those nonsignatory verifi-
cation devices do not solve the difficulty with physical signatures as much
as they highlight two fundamental problems with a payment system that
relies on physical signatures. First, a system that relies on physical signa-
tures cannot even make a pretense of verifying the signature without com-
paring the signature to a specimen signature of the customer; and the
logistics of getting the check to a place where it can be compared to the
signature and of effecting that comparison are relatively time consuming.
Second, even if the system goes to the trouble of making the comparison,
the comparison of a physical signature to a specimen signature is necessarily
inexact and cannot significantly deter a determined forger.
Those problems are directly attributable to the document-based system
of negotiability out of which the checking system has developed. Non-
signatory verification systems may mitigate those problems, but they cannot
solve them completely, if only because of the expense of grafting a universal
nonsignatory verification system onto the current checking system.'64 To
completely solve those problems, the system would have to cut loose from
the documentary moorings of negotiability and move to an entirely non-
documentary system, perhaps one that relies on digital signatures. A
digital-signature system would fulfill the verification function much more
effectively than the current system because digital signatures can be verified
much more inexpensively and reliably than conventional physical signa-
tures.
In its most common current form, a digital signature is a unique identi-
fier that a signer imprints onto a document with a secret key (the "private
key"). 65 The process of imprinting that signature encrypts the message
and performs a numerical calculation based on the text of the message to
which the signature is attached; the signature appears in the form of a
number (the "hash value") that is the end result of the calculation. Readers
of the message can check the validity of the signature with a second key
(the "public key"). Using the public key, the digital-signature software
performs a second numerical calculation on the text of the signed message.
If nobody has altered the message, and the signor executed it with the
private key that corresponds to the public key that the software is using,
then the hash value in the digital signature will bear the correct relation to
164. Most obviously, it is difficult to contemplate a system that would require consumers to
make a nonsignatory verification of each check that they write.
165. For a thorough and lucid discussion of the mechanics of digital signatures, see A.
Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L.
REv. 49, 51-67 (1996).
the message, so that the public-key calculation will decode the encrypted
message and produce an intelligible document. If the message has been
altered or if the message was encrypted without the correct private key, the
public key will fail to decode the message and the forgery or alteration will
be evident.
When compared to the conventional system of verifying authorizations
based on physical signatures, the digital-signature system has several advan-
tages. First, in the digital-signature system, the process of signature verifica-
tion is completely objective, making the likelihood of error quite small.
Second, because the process is computerized, it does not require the inter-
vention, time, or judgment of individual employees. Third, the likelihood
of forgery is considerably diminished: absent a theft of the private key, it is
highly unlikely that a forger successfully could imprint a signature that
would appear to be valid. Finally, and of particular importance, the use of
a digital signature makes alteration extraordinarily difficult. If the docu-
ment is changed after the signature is imprinted, then assuming that the
altering party does not have the private key, the public-key calculation will
not decode the message because the signature will not bear the proper
(private-key generated) relation to the message as it reaches the reader.
Thus, any attempt to verify the signature of an altered document will reveal
the alteration.
In the end, the focus of negotiability on the signature is just as
cumbersome as its focus on the physical check. However much sense a
signature requirement might have made in simpler days when purchasers of
negotiable instruments could be expected to have some personal knowledge
of the parties whose signatures purported to appear on instruments, it makes
no sense at all in a modem checking system that presents a single institu-
tion with millions of checks to evaluate every single day. In a world in
which banks lose hundreds of millions of dollars to check fraud each
year,'16 the ready availability of more effective and reliable substitutes in-
dicates that the system can only be improved by a prompt move beyond a
signature-based system.
C. Rights of a Holder in Due Course
To the lay observer, the most prominent attribute of negotiability is
the ability of the holder in due course to defeat a variety of defenses and
166. See Jaret Seiberg, Fed Says That Check Fraud Cost Banks and Thrifts $615M in '95, Am.
BANKER, Oct. 17, 1996 (discussing Federal Reserve survey estimating 1995 losses from check
fraud at $615 million).
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claims related to an instrument that would have been valid against prior
parties to the payment transaction. In practice, however, that legal right
has even less relevance to the daily operation of the checking system than
the signature requirement discussed above.
The reason that holder-in-due-course status is irrelevant is simple: The
parties that qualify as holders in due course in the checking system almost
invariably have other remedies that in the overwhelming flow of cases are
much more effective than a suit relying on holder-in-due-course status.
Consider a standard check transaction based on the model transaction from
Part I, in which Clothier writes a check to Merchant to purchase wool.
Merchant promptly deposits the check into its account at Depositary Bank.
Depositary Bank then forwards the check for collection to Payor Bank, the
bank at which Clothier maintains its account. Next, suppose that Clothier
stops payment on the check because it is unsatisfied with the wool.
167
Accordingly, Payor Bank dishonors the check and returns it to Depositary
Bank.' 6 The only party that could be a holder in due course in the trans-
action would be Depositary Bank. Merchant would be subject to Clothier's
claims because it was the original party to the sale transaction in which
Clothier issued the check. 169  Thus, the relevance of holder-in-due-course
status to that transaction is that it would enable Depositary Bank 170 to
enforce the check against Clothier (the drawer of the check) without regard
to the merits of Clothier's claims against Merchant (the original payee of
the check).'M
But that right is almost completely nugatory because the depositary
bank has a much more effective remedy at hand in its right of charge-
back.77 The right of charge-back allows the depositary bank to protect
167. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1995) (describing a customer's right to stop payment).
168. See id. § 4-301(a) (allowing a payor bank to revoke a provisional settlement if it returns
an item and sends written notice of dishonor by its midnight deadline).
169. See id. § 3-305(b) (1991) (even a holder in due course is subject to claims made against
itself).
170. Depositary Bank would have that right only if it became a holder in due course. Assum-
ing that Depositary Bank had no notice of Clothier's complaint, Depositary Bank would become
a holder in due course if it gave "value" for the check. Id. § 3-302(a)(2). To give value generally
would require Depositary to make the funds represented by the check available to Merchant for
withdrawal. Id. § 4-211 (1995) (depositary bank gives value when it obtains a security interest);
id. § 4-2 10(a)(1), (2) (depositary bank obtains security interest when funds are withdrawn or when
credit is "available for withdrawal as of right").
171. See id. § 3-305(b) (1991) (holder in due course takes free of personal defenses of the
obligor against a party other than the holder).
172. 1 am not the first academic to note the relative attractiveness of the charge-back option.
Professor Rosenthal noted it 25 years ago, but concluded that banks at that time still regularly
exercised their holder-in-due-course rights. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Negodiability-Who Needs It?,
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itself directly by the simple device of charging the check back to the depos-
itor's account, removing any provisional credit that it gave the depositor at
the time of the deposit."' From the perspective of the depositary bank,
the charge-back remedy is much more effective than the right to sue the
drawer offered by holder-in-due-course status. Ordinarily, the depositary
bank can make itself completely whole by reversing any credit in the depos-
itor's account-making a single simple computer entry-and by sending a
written notice to the depositor of the charge-back. '74
The bankers with whom I have discussed the topic universally agree
that the depositary bank normally would not respond to dishonor by pursu-
ing the drawer. For example, one banker remarked, "I've never even heard
of that." ' Rather, the typical procedure upon return of a check is to
charge the check back to the depositing customer. '76 When pressed for
the existence of any alternative responses, the only practicable alternative
the bankers suggested was to send the check through for collection a second
time. 177
The aversion to relying on holder-in-due-course status to pursue the
drawer is easy to understand. Where a charge-back generally should make
the depositary bank whole in a few moments,' 78 the right against the
drawer is much less likely to make the depositary bank whole, either
71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 382-85 (1971) (describing a "steady stream of reported cases"). He
argued that the unfairness of that result to check writers justified abolition of holder-in-due-course
status. Id. at 402. As I argue below, the current situation seems to be different from the situa-
tion he observed-in current practice, banks seem to rely on the holder-in-due-course option
quite rarely. Accordingly, abolishing holder-in-due-course status would have no significant direct
effect on rights against check writers.
173. See U.C.C. § 4-214(a) (1995) (allowing depositary bank to charge a check back to its
customer if the payor bank does not honor the check).
174. See id. (describing mechanics of charge-back).
175. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122.
176. See id.; First Chicago Site Visit, supra note 122; Interview with Frank Trotter, Director,
International Markets Division, Mark Twain Bancshares, in St. Louis, Mo. (Apr. 1996); Tele-
phone Interview with Joe DeKunder, Vice President, NationsBank of Texas, N.A. (Apr. 1996)
[hereinafter DeKunder Interview].
177. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122; DeKunder Interview, supra note 176. The
officer at Boatmen's explained that their large customers pay a fee to have checks under $100
reprocessed automatically. About two-thirds to three-quarters of the checks are honored the
second time through. The depositary bank then charges any remaining checks back to the depos-
itor. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 122.
178. The only exception would be situations in which the depositary bank has allowed its
customer to withdraw funds represented by the check before the check has cleared. Even in that
situation, the bank would have a right to recover the funds from its customer. See U.C.C.
§ 4-214(d)(1) (1995) (charge-back is available even after funds are withdrawn).
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because the drawer is insolvent or because the drawer does not wish to pay
as a result of some disagreement with the payee.179
To be sure, that does not demonstrate that holder-in-due-course status
never matters. After all, theoretically there should be cases in which for
some reason a bank cannot charge a check back to its depositor and must
rely on holder-in-due-course status to recover from the original drawer. But
consider all the circumstances that would have to occur for holder-in-due-
course status to become relevant to enforcement of a check: (a) a bank lets
its customer withdraw uncollected funds, (b) the bank is unable to recover
the funds from its customer, (c) the amount of the claim is sufficient to
justify pursuing the drawer, (d) the drawer's financial strength is sufficient
to make pursuit worthwhile, (e) the drawer has a defense that would be
valid against the original payee,I" (f) the bank successfully defeats that
claim because it is a holder in due course,'81 and (g) the bank successfully
collects on its claim. The conjunction of all of those characteristics seems
so rare that it resembles a stroke of lightning more than a fundamental
organizing feature of the system.
179. Neither of which would be a surprising circumstance in a case in which a check was
dishonored.
180. In some cases, of course, the drawer will have no valid defense, so holder-in-due-course
status will not be necessary to the depositary bank's action. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 981 F.2d 127, 132-34 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that lack of good
faith deprives bank of holder-in-due-course status, but allowing it to enforce checks anyway be-
cause of the failure of a drawer to establish a personal defense); Diamond Say. Loan Co. v.
Hoisington, No. 88AP-976, 1989 WL 104389, at *1-*6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 12, 1989) (rejecting
a series of purely procedural defenses interposed by the drawer), appeal dismissed, 550 N.E.2d 479
(Ohio 1990); see also, e.g., Citizens First Bank v. Intercontinental Express, Inc., 713 P.2d 1097,
1097-99 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (ruling in favor of bank without suggesting any defense to enforce-
ment of the check).
181. In some cases, the bank's suit will fail because the bank will not be able to establish
holder-in-due-course status. See, e.g., M & I Marshall & llsley Bank v. National Fin. Servs.
Corp., 704 F. Supp. 890, 891-92 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (bank was not a holder because it was not in
possession of the check); Great Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Pima Say. & Loan Ass'n, 718 P.2d
1017, 1018-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (depositary bank took subject to personal defenses because
it had knowledge of them when it took a check); Key Bank, N.A. v. Strober Bros., Inc., 523
N.Y.S.2d 855, 856-58 (App. Div. 1988) (notation on a check put depositary bank on notice of
claims). In other cases, the bank's suit may not fail directly, but the bank's efforts to establish
holder-in-due-course status will require considerable litigation. See also Robbins v. Hasan, 625
N.Y.S.2d 160, 161 (App. Div. 1995) (affirming the trial court's denial of summary judgment for
holder based on issues of fact about holder-in-due-course status); Central Trust Co. v. Fricker, No.
47-CA-85, 1986 WL 3921, at *1-*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1986) (reversing trial court's deci-
sion ruling against a holder for insufficient evidence and remanding for a second trial); Oostburg
State Bank v. United Say. & Loan Ass'n, 386 N.W.2d 53, 54-59 (Wis. 1986) (reversing a trial
court's default judgment in favor of the holder and remanding for further proceedings).
To verify that hypothesis, I undertook a survey of reported cases in an
effort to assess the frequency of litigation over holder-in-due-course status in
the enforcement of checks. I conducted a broad search on Westlaw for all
cases decided since 1985 that mention holder-in-due-course status and
checks.'82  Examination of the cases recovered by that search"83
revealed only fifteen cases in which a depositary bank relied on holder-in-
due-course status to enforce a check (a little less than 1.5 cases per
year), I 4 only one of which was decided in the last three years.' In a
world in which hundreds of millions of checks bounce each year,'86 one
or two reported opinions per year is a truly tiny number.
I generally am skeptical about the use of reported opinions as a device
to discover commercial practices because of the high probability that the
sample of reported cases will differ significantly from the patterns of con-
duct in cases that do not lead to litigation or, even if they do lead to litiga-
tion,'8 7 do not produce reported opinions.' That problem seems to
182. I ran a search in the ALLCASES database for CHECK AND "HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE" AND DATE (AFT 1985).
183. I ran the search on November 25, 1996, and recovered 346 cases.
184. The search period was more than ten years, beginning on January 1, 1986, and includ-
ing all cases posted to the ALLCASES database by October 4, 1996.
185. In reverse chronological order, the fifteen cases were: Braden Corp. v. Citizens National
Bank, 661 N.E.2d 838 (nd. Ct. App. 1996); Nationsbank v. Cookies, Inc., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d 838 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jul. 21, 1993); First of America Bank-Northeast Illinois v. Bocian, 614 N.E.2d
890 (ll. Ct. App. 1993); National City Bank v. Azodi, 610 N.E.2d 1232 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1992);
Dempsey v. Etowah Bank, 418 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Galatia Community State Bank v.
Kindy, 821 S.W.2d 765 (Ark. 1991); Bank of New York v. Asati, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 521 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Vail National Bank v. Finkelman, 800 P.2d 1342 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1990); Great Country Bank v. Dacko, No. CV87 02 44 11, 1990 WL 290125 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jul. 20, 1990); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Polkinghorne, 801 P.2d 735 (Okla Ct. App. 1990);
First State Bank v. Tate, No. 3, 1988 WL 77625 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 1988); Huntington
National Bank v. Swiger, No. 1701, 1987 WI. 18034 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 30, 1987); First
American Bank v. Litchfield Co., 353 S.E.2d 143 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Valley Bank v. JER
Management Corp., 719 P.2d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Western Bank v. RaDec Construction Co.,
382 N.W.2d 406 (S.D. 1986).
186. If I use the generous assumption that only 0.50% of all checks are returned unpaid, see
supra note 149 (reporting evidence that between 0.60% and 1.5% of the checks are returned at a
typical bank), then based on the 60-plus billion checks a year written in this country, see supra
note 121 (reporting statistics), the volume of returned checks each year would be about 300 mil-
lion.
187. Sam Gross and Kent Syverud's recent empirical study of the dynamics that force cases
to trial rather than settlement underscores that problem because they provide persuasive evidence
of the oddity of those few cases that proceed to trial. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996).
188. For a defense of an analysis based on studies of reported opinions, see Jason Scott
Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1859, 1902-05 (1996). That methodology is significantly different from the directly
valuable examination of reported opinions to obtain empirical data as to the factors that influ-
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me particularly likely to afflict the sample I present here given the small
amounts likely to be in dispute in most cases of dishonored checks. Never-
theless, taken together with the results of my interviews, the tiny number of
reported cases in which depositary banks rely on holder-in-due-course status
to enforce checks seems to provide some support for my hypothesis.
One final qualification is necessary to complete the analysis: the possi-
bility that holder-in-due-course status could matter in cases where the depo-
sitor was not itself the original payee because the check was negotiated to a
merchant or a check-cashing service before it was deposited. But that
possibility seems just as unlikely to offer great relevance to holder-in-due-
course status. First, as mentioned above, it is relatively uncommon for a
check to be negotiated to a third party before deposit."9 Second, the
bulk of the checks cashed by check-cashing services apparently are payroll
checks or government support checks that are extraordinarily unlikely to be
subject to personal defenses.' 9°  Indeed, when they do cash personal
checks, check-cashing services normally check with the payor bank in
advance to diminish the risk of dishonor.1 91 Finally, even in cases where
such a check is dishonored, the value of the holder-in-due-course defense
will be limited to the rare case in which the party that interposes the
defense has both (I) a valid defense'92 that can be defeated 93 by the
check casher's holder-in-due-course status, 94 and (II) sufficient assets to
ence trial courts in resolving ill-defined inquiries such as the propriety of piercing the corporate
veil. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036 (1991) (reporting the results of such an inquiry).
189. See supra note 152 (reporting statistics indicating that commercial check-cashing services
cash less than 0.25% of checks each year).
190. See CASKEY, supra note 152, at 55 ("[M]any [check-cashing) outlets cash only customers'
payroll or government assistance and entitlement checks.").
191. See id. at 55-56.
192. In some cases, holder-in-due-course status will be irrelevant because the drawer will not
interpose even a personal defense. See, e.g., Evers v. Money Masters, Inc., 417 S.E.2d 160,
161-62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (enforcing check without suggesting that the drawer raised a per-
sonal defense).
193. In some cases, the party trying to enforce the check will face a defense that it cannot
defeat even if it does have holder-in-due-course status. See, e.g., Kovash v. McCloskey, 386
N.W.2d 32, 32-35 (N.D. 1986) (a holder in due course cannot prevail against a party that signed
check only in a representative capacity); Columbus Checkcashiers, Inc. v. Stiles, 565 N.E.2d 883,
885-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (a holder in due course cannot enforce a check issued in an illegal
transaction); Check Cashing Place, Inc. v. Benefit Plan Admin., Inc., No. 87-1329, 1988 WL
23203, at "1-*2 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 1988) (judgment noted at 421 N.W.2d 117 (Table)) (a
holder in due course cannot prevail against a drawer that did not authorize execution of check).
194. Like banks, nonbanks that attempt to enforce checks sometimes lose because they are
unable to establish holder-in-due-course status. See, e.g., Alarcon v. Ferrari, 490 So. 2d 1047,
1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (denying holder-in-due-course status because "under the circum-
stances, the plaintiffs herein should have been on notice as to the need for further inquiry regard-
make pursuit of that party worthwhile.' 95 My survey of reported decisions
in this decade discovered only twelve such cases (fewer than 1.2 cases per
year), only one of which was decided in the last three years.'96 All things
considered, it seems highly unlikely that any substantial number of those
cases exists.
IV. PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE FUTURE: THE KING Is DEAD,
LONG LIVE THE KING!
The final interment of the negotiable instrument need not result in
any serious dislocation for the credit and payment systems in which negoti-
able instruments have been used. Rather, as this Article suggests, the
movement away from negotiable instruments has occurred with so little
dislocation that it has passed largely unnoticed by the affected academic
community.
In the generally large-dollar world of credit systems, the passage already
has been completed. Negotiability is gone, not only practically but also as
a matter of form. For high-credit borrowers whose obligations are publicly
traded, negotiability has given way to more effective systems that record the
issue, transfer, and satisfaction of the obligations electronically. Home-
mortgage notes-susceptible of public trading only through securitization-
have moved more slowly, but even there systems for electronic transfer are
ing the validity of the check"); Bohmfalk v. Linwood, 742 S.W.2d 518, 520-22 (Tex. App. 1987)
(remanding for trial to allow defendant to show that plaintiff was not a holder in due course
because he acquired check in a crap game). In others, they will encounter other types of proce-
dural obstacles, some of which are of their own making. See, e.g., Schein v. American Restaurant
Group, Inc., 794 S.W.2d 78, 78 (Tex. App. 1990) (refusing to entertain an appeal challenging
discovery sanctions against a holder after the holder voluntarily withdrew its action to enforce
the check).
195. The generally poor financial condition of persons that use check-cashing services is well
documented. See CASKEY, supra note 152, at 73-78.
196. In reverse chronological order, the twelve cases were: Connecticut State Check Cashing
Service, Inc. v. Merriam Manufacturing Co., No. CV-93-04606725, 1995 WL 137150 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995); Besnier-Scerma U.S.A. v. Wisconsin Protein Corp., No. C4-93-812, 1993
WL 413002 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1993); Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge,
619 N.E.2d 732 (il1. 1993); Dubin v. Hudson County Probation Department, 630 A.2d 1207 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1993); Wright v. Carter, 609 N.E.2d 1188 (nd. Ct. App. 1993); Lloyd's
Credit Corp. v. Marlin Management Services, Inc., 614 A.2d 812 (Vt. 1992); Municipal Court v.
Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519 (Ct. App. 1992); Unbank Co. v. Dolphin Temporary Help
Services, Inc., 485 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Checks Cashed, Inc. v. Summit
Communications, No. 89-270-11, 1990 WIL 37360 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1990); ABC Money
Exchange, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Association, No. 54162, 1988 WL 86758 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jun. 16, 1988); Grand Western Currency Exchange, Inc. v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co., 516
N.E.2d 486 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987); North Avenue East Check Cashing v. Aluf Plastics, Inc., 515 A.2d
1253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
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moving into place. 19 Finally, in contexts involving nonuniform obliga-
tions that are not suitable for trading, the negotiable instrument has passed
away for the less definitive but nonetheless forceful reason that negoti-
ability has so little to offer the parties that they are better off focusing their
attentions on more direct devices to diminish the likelihood that the bor-
rower will become recalcitrant after the transfer.
The forces of advancing financial sophistication move just as surely to
remove negotiability from payment systems. The only context in which it
retains significance even as a formal matter is in the retail transaction
where the payor "pays" the payee by transferring a claim against a
bank."'s Even in that context it appears only in the checking system, not
the functionally similar card-related systems. As Part III explains, however,
technological pressures have stripped all of the practical effects of negoti-
ability from the checking system.
It is only natural to close by asking what the passing of negotiability
can tell us about the future. Two implications are obvious: one related to
the practical mechanisms of payment systems, and the other to the legal
aspects. As a practical matter, the uniformity with which technological
and practical pressures push retail payment systems suggests to me that the
current melange of diverse payment options will converge into systems that
are substantially identical to the consumer, differing only in the identity of
the third party that ultimately commits to pay the payee. Although the
available systems currently differ significantly on such fundamental ques-
tions as how the financial institution becomes obligated to pay and when
the payor loses its right to stop payment, it seems clear that the future will
bring all systems to the same result-final payment by the payee will be
substantially contemporaneous with the underlying transaction. That
contemporaneous commitment to pay already occurs in transactions with
credit and debit cards," 9 as well as in some of the developing electronic-
197. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 63, at 805-07 (describing plans for a mortgage
electronic registration system). Current information is available on the MERS homepage (visited
Feb. 20, 1997) <http://www.mersinc.org>.
198. See LOPUcKI, WARREN, KEATING & MANN, supra note 3 (manuscript assign. 15, at
1-5, on file with author) (explaining how all payment systems involve a transfer of a claim
against a financially responsible third party). I am indebted to Lynn LoPucki for numerous con-
versations out of which that view of payment systems developed.
199. See id. (manuscript assign. 18, at 3, on file with author) (debit cards); id. (manuscript
assign. 19, at 3, on file with author) (credit cards). I do expect that consumers will retain rights
to challenge payments as improper similar to the rights to challenge payments as improper that
they have in the credit-card and debit-card areas but given the rarity with which those rights are
exercised, their precise boundaries seem to me a detail, and not something as to which uniformity
of rule has any pressing importance.
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money systems. 2°° The impracticalities of the current check-collection
process suggest that the "float" that the checking system provides through
deferred collection cannot survive. Indeed, I would expect that the only
transactions in which the payee will not obtain a contemporaneous com-
mitment from the financial institution will be those in which payment is
made with cash or some cash substitute like a stored-value card that allows
the payor itself to provide a reliable indicator that payment will be forth-
coming. 20 1
Thus, although the consumer now sees numerous systems-bank-
operated check and debit-card systems, network-operated credit-card
systems, and developing electronic-money and stored-value card systems not
necessarily affiliated with any financial institution-the lesson from the
demise of negotiability is that all the systems will converge. None of those
systems can survive if they ignore the technology that makes it practical to
make payments more rapidly, more certainly, or more securely. Thus, any
system that fails to adopt the best technological option will follow negoti-
ability into extinction.
The passage of negotiability also has lessons for people who design the
legal aspects of financial systems. Negotiability is an area in which legal
academics have not served their constituencies well. As this Article
demonstrates, negotiability is now almost purely a conceptual system: an
intricate and elegant array of rules for resolving hypothetical situations that
do not occur with any frequency in actual financial transactions.02 Yet,
however severed from reality negotiability may be, legal academics continue
not only to spend whole courses teaching it to their students (a waste of
educational opportunity that is bad enough in itself), but also to use it as a
tool for analyzing issues of significance in transactions that do occur.203
To offer a single example, consider the discussion in drafts for the
recently adopted Restatement of Mortgages of the validity of payments that a
homeowner makes to the last known holder of its mortgage. The Reporters
quite sensibly concluded that such payments should bind the actual holder
of the note even if (unbeknownst to the homeowner) the actual holder is a
200. See id. (manuscript assign. 22, at 11-18, on file with author).
201. See id. at 1-11 (discussing stored-value card systems).
202. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
1997) (manuscript dated Oct. 7, 1996, at 13, 26, 36-37, on file with author) (discussing purely
conceptual systems and the reasons why it is not profitable to study them).
203. I thank Jim Rogers for a conversation out of which the following thoughts developed.
For his analogous thoughts, see Rogers, Horseless Carriages, supra note 5, at 695-98, which dis-
cusses how the use of outmoded legal concepts obstructs clear thinking about policy issues con-
cerning conflicting claims to ownership of securities.
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third party that never receives the payment. °4  That conclusion flies in
the face of classic rules of negotiability, which use possession as the touch-
stone for enforceability and thus grant no credit for payments made to a
party that is no longer in possession of the instrument."05 Working
within the conceptual framework of negotiability, the Reporters were not
content to justify that conclusion by reference to the obvious practicalities
of the situation: it obviously makes more sense to require the servicer of a
mortgage note to advise the homeowner where to send payments than it
does to obligate the homeowner to investigate that question on a monthly
basis.2'O Instead, the Reporters felt compelled to present a forced and
ultimately unpersuasive argument that the result called for by the practi-
calities of the situation could be reconciled with the rules for negotiability
articulated in Article 3 .2°7 The Reporters never mention that the rules of
Article 3 have little or no applicability to the context in question because
of the relative rarity of negotiable home-mortgage notes.
At the end, the goal of this Article, like much of my prior work, is to
illustrate the importance of context.YO° Legal academics do not add a lot
of value to the financial system by attempting to fit twenty-first-century
financial transactions into a system developed to facilitate pre-Industrial
Revolution financial transactions. We would provide much more service if
we attempted to understand the functions served by the systems that facili-
tate modem transactions and used that understanding to develop legal rules
that enhance those systems in the contexts Where they actually operate.
204. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.5 (Tentative Draft No. 5,
1996).
205. See U.C.C. § 3-602(a) (1991) ("lAin instrument is paid to the extent payment is
made ... to a person entitled to enforce the instrument."). A party that has sold the instrument
to a third party is no longer a person entitled to enforce the instrument. Thus, payments made
to such a party do not constitute payments on the instrument.
206. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.5 cmt. 9 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 1996) ("In theory the mortgagor could discover the transfer by demanding that the mort-
gagee exhibit the evidence of the obligation (typically a promissory note) before making each
payment, but such a demand would be extremely cumbersome for both mortgagor and mortgagee,
and is an entirely unrealistic expectation.").
207. See id. reporters' note. I understand from conversations with Steve Harris that dis-
cussion on the floor of the American Law Institute strongly criticized the Reporters' efforts to ac-
commodate their result to Article 3, and that some revision of that discussion is anticipated
before final publication of the Restatement.
208. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1997) (analyzing contextual reasons for the use and nonuse of secured credit); Ronald J. Mann,
The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for the Abandonment of Temporal Rules of Lien
Priority, 75 TEx. L. REV. 11 (1996) (analyzing the problems with a first-in-time rule of lien priority
in the construction-loan context).
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